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The ±¬ÁÏÍøAT concluded that Mr. Russo-Got failed to show that, in deciding the merits of his claims, the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in fact or in law, or that its Judgment was otherwise flawed.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by Mr. Postica. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no errors in the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment and dismissed the appeal.

The staff member appealed to ±¬ÁÏÍøAT arguing inter alia that there was no clear and convincing evidence in the record showing that he was aware that he was the subject of an investigation at the time he applied to the ±¬ÁÏÍøICEF job. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT determined that the letter from the IOM Legal Counsel (an authorized representative of an agency within the United Nations System) enjoyed the status of an ¡°official act¡± and as such carried with it ¡°the presumption of regularity¡±. The Tribunal found that once this evidence had been adduced, it was incumbent upon the staff member to rebut it, which he failed to do...

The evidence and submissions on record are insufficient to determine the material issue as to whether the Appellant¡¯s claim for compensation totaled less than, or in excess of, USD 25,000, in order to determine the authority of the Secretary of the ABCC to take the contested administrative decision. Hence the remand to ±¬ÁÏÍøDT to determine whether the Secretary of the ABCC had the valid power to take the contested decision.

The ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT acknowledged that the imposed disciplinary measure of separation from service without termination indemnity is one of the most severe disciplinary measures that the Agency can impose on a staff member. Nevertheless, it decided that, given the Appellant¡¯s misconduct in committing corporal punishment to a disabled and highly vulnerable child, and the Agency¡¯s clear zero-tolerance policy towards corporal punishment, the disciplinary measure imposed on the Appellant appeared to be neither absurd nor arbitrary; nor was there any evidence that the measure taken had been tainted by...

On the request for the oral hearing, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the matter could be considered just as well on written submissions and that it was not persuaded that an oral hearing was necessary in the interests of justice. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s complaints were about the content of the orders made, not about whether ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was empowered to make such orders, and as such, his appeal was not receivable and had to be dismissed. Noting that the case would be dismissed, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT made the following observations on the merits of the appeal: (1) ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was entitled to determine issues of receivability in...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment. The Tribunal explained although there is no expectancy of renewal, renewal of FTAs are ¡°normally¡± for a period of two years ¡°at a time¡±. Because of the words ¡°at a time¡±, the Tribunal cautioned that although a new FTA would supersede a previous one, it would not necessarily subsume the previous one. As such, a subsequent FTA would constitute a separate FTA. However, the Tribunal also highlighted that the applicable law in this case allowed the Administration to renew FTAs for periods less than two years. In conclusion, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held there...

Noting that the Appellant passed away during the course of the litigation and before the hearing of the appeal before ±¬ÁÏÍøAT, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the claim, namely her challenge to the Administration¡¯s refusal to move her back to her previous position, did not pass to her legal successor(s) in interest, no action is allowed to be commenced by her personal representative or successor in interest and that, under the specific circumstances of the case and due to the nature of the dispute, the issue in dispute was moot. Notwithstanding the mootness of the issue in dispute, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT remanded the case to the SAB, directing that the appeal be reconsidered by a neutral first instance process that issues a final decision. Citing Dispert & Hoe, Spinardi, Sheffer, Fogarty, and Fogarty et al., the Tribunal explained that the SAB must satisfy the requirement under Article 2 (10) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute, which requires that the first instance process produce a final decision on the appeal and not a recommendation to the Secretary-General, as was the case under the then IMO Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (SRSR). The Tribunal also called into question whether the IMO Secretary...

±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in deciding that Mr. Adriantseheno had been charged solely with sexual harassment, that his behavior towards Vo1 and Vo2 did not constitute sexual harassment, and that his due process rights were violated.