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±¬ÁÏÍøAT a d¨¦tenu que l'appel par le membre du personnel du jugement de l'±¬ÁÏÍøDT ¨¦tait d¨¦fectueux car il n'a identifi¨¦ aucun des cinq motifs d'appel indiqu¨¦s ¨¤ l'article 2.1 de la loi de l'±¬ÁÏÍøAT. Unat a statu¨¦ que l'appelant n'avait pas expliqu¨¦ pourquoi le licenciement de sa demande par l'±¬ÁÏÍøDT ¨¦tait erron¨¦. De plus, Unat a ¨¦galement jug¨¦ qu'il ne trouvait aucune erreur dans la pratique de l'±¬ÁÏÍøDT pour rejeter une demande de manque de poursuites lorsqu'il y a suffisamment de raisons de supposer que le demandeur n'est plus int¨¦ress¨¦ par le litige, sur la base de l'article 19 (gestion des cas) et l...

Unat a jug¨¦ que Undt avait commis une erreur en droit en d¨¦clarant qu'elle n'avait aucune comp¨¦tence en tant que r¨¦clamation de M. Kebede concernant les affaires internes du syndicat du personnel, et donc une zone prot¨¦g¨¦e contre l'ing¨¦rence de l'employeur. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT a toutefois jug¨¦ que l'erreur ¨¦tait sans cons¨¦quence parce que la demande d'indemnisation de M. Kebede ¨¦tait autrement d¨¦raill¨¦e par r¨¨gle 3.17 (ii) (ii). ±¬ÁÏÍøDT a ¨¦galement commis une erreur en concluant que la demande de transfert de M. Kebede n'¨¦tait pas ¨¤ recevoir par manque de comp¨¦tence.

L'±¬ÁÏÍøAT n'a pas ¨¦t¨¦ en mesure de d¨¦tecter aucune erreur dans le jugement de l'±¬ÁÏÍøD, qui est en accord avec la jurisprudence coh¨¦rente de l'±¬ÁÏÍøAT.

Inscrit en d¨¦saccord avec ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT et a trouv¨¦ la demande du superviseur ¨¤ l'agence d'accorder au membre du personnel une allocation sp¨¦ciale constituait ¨¦galement une demande implicite du membre du personnel lui-m¨ºme. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT a estim¨¦ que non seulement le superviseur avait agi sur la demande express du membre du personnel lorsqu'il a envoy¨¦ la recommandation ¨¤ l'agence, mais il ¨¦tait ¨¦galement apparente et compris que le membre du personnel et le superviseur ¨¦taient partie du processus. De plus, dans ce cas particulier, c'est le membre du personnel qui a suivi l'agence concernant le statut de la...

Unat a jug¨¦ que ±¬ÁÏÍøDT ne s'est pas tromp¨¦ dans l'¨¦valuation des preuves pr¨¦sent¨¦es. Unat a soutenu que ±¬ÁÏÍøDT avait raison dans sa conclusion que je) il semblerait que la situation de l'appelant avec son ancien Fro avait ¨¦t¨¦ r¨¦solue car ils ne travaillaient plus ensemble; ii) Le r¨¦affectation temporaire ¨¦ventuel de l'appelant semblerait avoir ¨¦t¨¦ une solution suppl¨¦mentaire tr¨¨s raisonnable pour le faire sortir d'un environnement de bureau dans lequel il a ¨¦videmment continu¨¦ ¨¤ se sentir mal ¨¤ l'aise, et iii), il appartiendrait ¨¤ la discr¨¦tion de l'administration de mettre en ?uvre l'une des...

En appel, Unat a jug¨¦ que l'±¬ÁÏÍøDT n'avait pas commis d'erreur de droit ou de fait en acceptant les estimations de trois h?pitaux diff¨¦rents en Turquie, bien que l'une de ces estimations dat¨¦e en d¨¦cembre 2015 (pr¨¨s de la date des interventions ¨¤ Gen¨¨ve, novembre 2015) et la Les deux autres estimations ont ¨¦t¨¦ soumises beaucoup plus tard en octobre 2019. L'±¬ÁÏÍøAT a tenu que l'estimation de d¨¦cembre 2015 ¨¦tait une estimation ¨¦quitable des frais m¨¦dicaux. Unat a ¨¦galement rejet¨¦ l'argument du membre du personnel selon lequel un taux de change plus favorable (1 USD: 3 essai), qui ¨¦tait applicable en...

As a preliminary matter, in response to the Appellant¡¯s request for interim measures, in which she requested that the Secretary-General complied with the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment insofar as it had not been appealed against, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT denied the motion on the basis that execution should have been requested before ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. On the Appellant¡¯s motion to strike assertions and evidence, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the Appellant was supplementing her appeal, and denied the motion. On the merits, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the appeal was limited to the request for further compensation, as per the Appellant¡¯s Power of Attorney document, and...

The Appeals Tribunal found that Mr. Karkara failed to show that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s assessment of the evidence had resulted in a manifestly unreasonable decision. It also found that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not make any errors with regard to the admissibility of witnesses. The ±¬ÁÏÍøAT further found that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not commit any procedural error, and Mr. Karkara¡¯s allegations of procedural irregularities did not put the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s findings into doubt. Accordingly, the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed that there was clear and convincing evidence of sexual abuse and exploitation by Mr. Karkara. The ±¬ÁÏÍøAT also held that the sanction of...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any errors in the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding that her application was filed one day late and was out of time. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that it is the receipt of the management evaluation response which triggers the time limit for filing an application to the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, and not the moment when the staff member or her legal representative could reasonably be assumed to have taken notice of the response. In concurrence with the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had not presented any exceptional circumstances to justify waiving the time limits and that any such...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that there were no errors in the decision of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT that the Appellant¡¯s application was irreceivable. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held the Appellant was notified of the decision not to shortlist him by e-mail of 14 November 2019. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s allegations regarding the abolishment of his post had no legal relevance for the appeal, which dealt only with issues of receivability. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Judgment.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by Mr. Postica. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no errors in the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Mr. Hammond¡¯s appeal is defective, as it does not address the issue of receivability or the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding that his application contesting his 2016-2017 performance appraisal was not receivable. Mr. Hammond¡¯s application was not receivable as the reclassification decision was taken by the General Assembly. It is not erroneous to call the reclassification of Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 post to an FS-6 post a ¡°conversion¡± or an ¡°abolishment¡± because, in effect, this classification resulted in Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 being abolished and replaced by, or converted into, an FS-6 post.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal, finding it not receivable. The Tribunal explained ±¬ÁÏÍøDT decisions on applications for suspension of action are not subject to appeal, pursuant to Article 2(2) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute. The Tribunal also noted that this case did not fall under the narrow exceptions when appeals against interlocutory orders are allowed, i.e. when it is alleged that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT has exceeded its competence or jurisdiction. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT did not find any excess of jurisdiction in the instant case and therefore deemed the appeal irreceivable.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not commit any errors when it found that Ms. Wenz¡¯ application was irreceivable ratione materiae and that therefore, it did not have to address the question of whether the application was also irreceivable ratione temporis. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT correctly found that ±¬ÁÏÍøICEF¡¯s participation in mediation efforts did not automatically extend the time limit for filing a request for management evaluation. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no fault in the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding that the Secretary-General was not estopped from raising the issue of receivability. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed...

Contrary to the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding, Mr. Kollie¡¯s letter of 7 June 2007 to the ABCC cannot be regarded as a request under Article 17 of the Appendix D to convene a medical board and reconsider the Secretary-General¡¯s decision. Nor can the emails of 25/27 July 2017 and 24 August 2017 be regarded as a review of the 16 May 2017 decision of the Secretary-General or an administrative decision under Article 2(1)(a) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute. The emails of 25/27 July 2017 constituted an implied appealable decision by the ABCC to reject Mr. Kollie¡¯s claim for reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses. But...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the application for revision, because Mr. Sirhan did not present any decisive fact which could lead to a revision of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Judgment.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment, finding that the staff member¡¯s FTA was not terminated but rather, it expired in its own course. The Tribunal highlighted that a termination is initiated by the Secretary-General, under Staff Rule 9.6(a), and in the instant case, the staff member was not at all terminated on 30 May 2019. Instead, his FTA continued until its expiry on 30 June 2019, and until then, he retained his full position, rights and entitlements as a staff member of the Organization. The fact that the site was closed down, and the staff member was sent home with no work to do, is not...

The Tribunals do not have reviewability of ICSC decisions, they do have jurisdiction to review the Secretary-General¡¯s mechanical power in implementing such decisions on narrow grounds for legality. The ICSC decision to adjust the salary scale and post-adjustment allowance multiplier was not a reviewable decision. The Secretary-General¡¯s implementation of that decision was an administrative decision as it was not a general policy but had adverse individual impact per staff member via their payslips and was therefore receivable. While receivable the ICSC decision remained not reviewable for...

On appeal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not commit an error of law or fact in accepting estimates from three different hospitals in Turkey, although one such estimate dated in December 2015 (close to the date of the interventions in Geneva, November 2015) and the other two estimates were submitted much later in October 2019. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held the December 2015 estimate was a fair estimate of the medical costs. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT also rejected the staff member¡¯s argument that a more favourable exchange rate (1 USD : 3 TRY), which was applicable in 2016, should have been applied to the October 2019 estimates. The Tribunal...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law in stating that it had no jurisdiction as Mr Kebede¡¯s claim concerned the internal affairs of the staff union, and therefore, an area protected from employer interference. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held, however, that error was without consequence because Mr Kebede¡¯s claim for compensation was otherwise time-barred per Staff Rule 3.17(ii). ±¬ÁÏÍøDT also erred in finding that Mr Kebede¡¯s application for a transfer was not receivable for lack of jurisdiction.