±¬ÁÏÍø

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the appeal, in which the Appellant contended that exceptional circumstances existed that would merit a waiver of the time limit, allowing his application to be admitted. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that, in such an instance, it is the applicant¡¯s responsibility to convince the tribunal of such circumstances. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that the Appellant did not overcome this hurdle before ±¬ÁÏÍøDT and held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err in rejecting the Appellant¡¯s contentions that he had exceptional circumstances. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT further held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the Appellant¡¯s reliance on erroneous advice...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate that the contested decision had adverse effects on his terms and conditions of employment, in particular his health insurance and benefits. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had brought no relevant arguments to challenge ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding that there was no administrative decision within ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s jurisdiction being contested. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered Ms Comerford-Verzuu¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal, regarding whether ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was correct in holding that the contested decision was dated 2 August 2005 and that the request for administrative review was time-barred. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that the OIOS reply of 2 August 2005 was the administrative decision of which Ms Comerford-Verzuu was seeking a review. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the subsequent correspondence was unwarranted and did not extend the time limit for seeking administrative review of the first administrative order. Accordingly, the time limit for seeking administrative...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered Ms Worsley¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that there was no evidence that OSLA¡¯s decision to not represent Ms Worsley was based on her disability. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that Ms Worsley did not show how OSLA¡¯s actions affected her rights or her case, as she was simply repeating arguments that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT previously considered in its judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment with regard to its decision that the right of staff members to receive assistance from OSLA does not amount to a right to be represented by OSLA.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had neither standing to challenge a decision which he alleged did not comply with the stipulations of his service contract nor the right to request the implementation of an arbitration procedure before ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. However, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT had committed an error in concluding that the Appellant had manifestly abused the process. The appeal was partially upheld and the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment partially vacated regarding the payment of USD 500.00 for abuse of procedure.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application was submitted to ±¬ÁÏÍøDT after the expiration of the response period; the response period began on the date on which she received a letter from the Management Evaluation Unit informing her that her request for a management evaluation was not receivable because, as a judge, she was not a staff member or a former staff member within the meaning of the Staff Rules. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judge erred on a question of fact, by considering the letter as the decision that concluded the management evaluation, and that it erred on a...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered Mr Al Sayyed¡¯s appeal and found that the decision to terminate his service, effective from close of business 15 December 2007, and as communicated to him on 30 November 2007, was superseded by the action he took on 4 December 2007, an action reinforced by him on 7 January 2008. Under these circumstances, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA did not err in dismissing Mr Al Sayyed¡¯s appeal against his termination on the basis that there was no termination decision capable of review. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that, given the absolute restriction on its judicial discretion with respect to time limits, ±¬ÁÏÍøDT ought not to have entered into a review of the possible existence of exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the time limit. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the complaint was filed beyond the time limit for administrative review or management evaluation and beyond the threshold for receivability established by the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s Statute and Rules of Procedure. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had not established any error in fact or law emerging from the impugned judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the Appellant did not challenge the competitive procedure¡¯s final administrative act since he only began to contest the Administration¡¯s actions when the selected candidate was laterally moved, and another rostered candidate was appointed as a replacement. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s rights as a staff member were linked to the administrative decision that completed the selection procedure and that, as such, any breach of his rights could only be caused by that...