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Unat a jug¨¦ que l'accord sp¨¦cial de l'±¬ÁÏÍøSA et les r¨¨gles du personnel de l'ISA qui en r¨¦sultent ne respectent pas la loi ±¬ÁÏÍøAT et, par cons¨¦quent, l'±¬ÁÏÍøAT n'est pas en mesure d'exercer sa juridiction en tant que tribunal de deuxi¨¨me niveau. Le pouvoir juridictionnel de Unat, Ratione Personae et Ratione Materiae ne peut ¨ºtre ¨¦tabli ou ¨¦tendu unilat¨¦ralement par les parties en litige par le biais d'un contrat de proc¨¦dure, express¨¦ment ou tacitement convenu.

Unat ¨¦tait d'accord avec ±¬ÁÏÍøDT et a constat¨¦ que la d¨¦cision administrative ne pouvait pas ¨ºtre consid¨¦r¨¦e comme une ?r¨¦siliation d¨¦guis¨¦e?. Unat a jug¨¦ que le membre du personnel n'¨¦tait pas s¨¦par¨¦ du service le 29 mai 2019, et il a en fait continu¨¦ ¨¤ conserver sa position compl¨¨te, ses droits et ses droits d'un membre du personnel jusqu'¨¤ l'expiration de son ALE le 30 juin 2019.

Unat a convenu avec undt et a constat¨¦ que les preuves du dossier soutient la conclusion de l'±¬ÁÏÍøDT que l'absence du membre du personnel du 18 janvier 2017 au 26 juillet 2018 n'a pas ¨¦t¨¦ non autoris¨¦e, car elle n'a pas fourni de certificat m¨¦dical d?ment autoris¨¦ ou autre justification de son incapacit¨¦ ¨¤ signaler travailler. Unat a ¨¦galement constat¨¦ que le refus de la Division des services m¨¦dicaux (MSD) pour certifier la demande de cong¨¦ de maladie du membre du personnel apr¨¨s le 18 janvier 2017 ¨¦tait raisonnable et que le MSD ¨¦tait l'organisme technique comp¨¦tent pour ¨¦valuer les...

Unat a accept¨¦ et a constat¨¦ que les preuves sur le dossier soutiennent la conclusion de l'±¬ÁÏÍøDE que l'action administrative ¨¦tait l¨¦gale et rationnelle pour faire avancer les besoins op¨¦rationnels de l'organisation. Deuxi¨¨mement, Unat n'a ¨¦galement trouv¨¦ aucune erreur dans la conclusion de l'±¬ÁÏÍøD que la d¨¦cision administrative n'a pas ¨¦t¨¦ entach¨¦e par des motifs inappropri¨¦s et que le membre du personnel n'avait pas rempli sa charge de preuve de prouver le contraire. Enfin, Unat n'a trouv¨¦ aucune erreur dans la conclusion ±¬ÁÏÍøDT que le trajet suppl¨¦mentaire de 17 km n'¨¦tait pas trop on¨¦reux...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in fact and in law in its finding that the facts of misconduct were not established by clear and convincing evidence. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that a number of the factual findings made by ±¬ÁÏÍøDT were not supported by the evidence and were unreasonable. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT should have limited itself to determining whether the Secretary-General was within his authority to impose disciplinary measures on Mr. Hossain, and that by speculating on the misconduct of another individual, the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT exceeded its competence. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT disagreed and distinguished the case at hand with the two cases cited by the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT explained that in the case at hand, the staff member¡¯s actions could have a substantial reputational impact on the Organization and could also adversely affect the relationship between the Organization, Member States and the Host Country. The Tribunal emphasized that the actions of the staff member went beyond the mere internal affairs of the Organization and in fact the fraudulent act was used as an instrument to avoid legal proceedings in the Host Country. As such, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT concluded that the misconduct...

Noting that the Appellant passed away during the course of the litigation and before the hearing of the appeal before ±¬ÁÏÍøAT, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the claim, namely her challenge to the Administration¡¯s refusal to move her back to her previous position, did not pass to her legal successor(s) in interest, no action is allowed to be commenced by her personal representative or successor in interest and that, under the specific circumstances of the case and due to the nature of the dispute, the issue in dispute was moot. Notwithstanding the mootness of the issue in dispute, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law with regard to its finding that the second decision to renew the Appellant¡¯s fixed-term appointment superseded the first decision to renew his appointment (the challenged decision). Nevertheless, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that this finding was not dispositive of the appeal in the Appellant¡¯s favour, as his application was not receivable on the grounds of another basis of mootness. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the contested decision to renew his fixed-term appointment by three months instead of two years did not constitute an appealable administrative decision for the simple reason that the...

The evidence and submissions on record are insufficient to determine the material issue as to whether the Appellant¡¯s claim for compensation totaled less than, or in excess of, USD 25,000, in order to determine the authority of the Secretary of the ABCC to take the contested administrative decision. Hence the remand to ±¬ÁÏÍøDT to determine whether the Secretary of the ABCC had the valid power to take the contested decision.

It was a reasonable exercise of the Commissioner-General¡¯s discretion to determine that intentionally abusing a position of power and trust against a beneficiary of ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA in a vulnerable situation rendered Mr. Al Khatib unfit for further service with the Agency, and separation from service without termination indemnity was neither unfair nor disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT remanded the case to the SAB, directing that the appeal be reconsidered by a neutral first instance process that issues a final decision. Citing Dispert & Hoe, Spinardi, Sheffer, Fogarty, and Fogarty et al., the Tribunal explained that the SAB must satisfy the requirement under Article 2 (10) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute, which requires that the first instance process produce a final decision on the appeal and not a recommendation to the Secretary-General, as was the case under the then IMO Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (SRSR). The Tribunal also called into question whether the IMO Secretary...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the facts upon which ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA based its decision were established, in full respect of his due process rights. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT did not err as there was clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant committed sexual exploitation and abuse against a beneficiary of ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA; neither did it err in concluding that the disciplinary sanction was proportionate and lawful. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant, by having the complainant remove her pants and underwear and engaging in a such a sensitive and specific medical examination, which he did not have the required competencies and...

The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in fact in concluding that the ABCC had solely and exclusively rested upon the MSD¡¯s medical report, and the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT exceeded its competence in stating that the time limit under Article 12 of Appendix D would only start to run from the moment when the psychological symptoms were so severe that the patient acknowledged that his/her syndrome no longer allowed him/her to fulfill his/her professional obligations. In the light of the facts that the Applicant was able to return to his high level of functioning at work after he had been transferred out of HATIS on 1 December 2013, that...

The impugned ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Order clearly comes within its competence to issue appropriate case management orders. It did not exceed its competence or jurisdiction in issuing Order No. 123, and Mr. Zaqqout is not prevented from attacking the interlocutory order later if he appeals the final judgment of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT on the merits.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT first dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that although the Administration has the discretion to reassign staff members, such reassignment must be reasonable in the particular circumstances and cause no economic harm to the staff member. It must also respect the procedural and substantive rules of law and must not be arbitrary. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed with the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT that the reassignment was performance-related and yet the staff member was never allowed the opportunity to address his performance issues prior to being reassigned. Regarding the appeal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT disagreed with the staff member that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT...

The staff member submits that the ¡°decisive fact¡± which was unknown to him and to the Appeals Tribunal was the erroneous interpretation and application from case to case of Article 10(5) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Statute, Regulation 11.3 of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA International Staff Regulations and Article 9(1)(a) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT disagreed that a variance in the interpretation or application of the law from case to case constitute a ¡°decisive fact¡± that would warrant revision. The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that it did not meet the statutory requirements and that it was in fact a disguised...

Appeals dismissed, ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgments upheld. The Tribunals do not have reviewability of ICSC decisions, they do have jurisdiction to review the Secretary-General¡¯s mechanical power in implementing such decisions on narrow grounds for legality. The ICSC decision to adjust the salary scale and post-adjustment allowance multiplier was not a reviewable decision. The Secretary-General¡¯s implementation of that decision was an administrative decision as it was not a general policy but had adverse individual impact per staff member via their payslips and was therefore receivable. While receivable the...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no fault with the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s reasoning that the letter of 24 November 2017 was unambiguous and unconditional about the separation of Ms Patkar upon the expiration of her appointment and agreed that the letter conveyed the final decision of the Administration not to renew her appointment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the letter produced a direct adverse consequence which was not contingent upon the possibility of Ms Patkar¡¯s selection for any other position. Nor did the relevant provision in the letter that the non-renewal decision would cease to be applicable if Ms Patkar should be selected for...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed with ±¬ÁÏÍøDT and found that the administrative decision could not be regarded as a ¡°disguised termination¡±. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the staff member was not separated from service on 29 May 2019, and he in fact continued to retain his full position, rights, and entitlements of a staff member until the expiry of his FTA on 30 June 2019.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍø-ISA Special Agreement and the resulting ISA Staff Rules do not comply with the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute and, consequently, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT is unable to exercise its jurisdiction as a second-level tribunal. The jurisdictional power of ±¬ÁÏÍøAT, ratione personae, and ratione materiae cannot be established or extended unilaterally by the litigating parties through a procedural contract, expressly or tacitly agreed.