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±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Ms Kortes¡¯ cross-appeal. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the issue was whether ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in concluding that the Administration was estopped from correcting its mistake by finding that Ms Kortes was not eligible for ASHI, having advised her in 2011 that she could not avail herself of the buy-in option. Noting that the Administration¡¯s error was to inform Ms Kortes that she could buy-in to ASHI, based on a misunderstanding of the date she joined the Organisation, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT committed an error of law in coming to its conclusion that five years was...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered all the grounds of the appeal and held that the issue of whether the Appellant¡¯s application was pre-screened by a Human Resources Officer was irrelevant to determine whether his candidature received full and fair consideration. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the main issue for its determination was whether, at the time of application, the Inspira system had provided all of the correct options to the Appellant. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that this was a factual determination which, without relevant evidence, could not be made. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT failed to enquire as to what options were available in the...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the first time the Appellant¡¯s claim for implementation of the sanction (an apology to the Appellant) was raised was on appeal and that it was therefore not receivable, however, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant was not barred from requesting ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA to enforce its letter of censure. On the Appellant¡¯s claim for moral damages, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no error in ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT¡¯s order denying the Appellant¡¯s request for moral damages since there was no evidence of harm. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT judgment.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. On receivability, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT opined that it doubted whether the application was receivable, but due to some uncertainties and because the matter was of general interest, it would decide the case on the merits. On the merits, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law in finding that Ms Haq and Ms Kane had a fundamental right to be fully and accurately informed about their pension entitlements at the time of their appointments. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law in failing to consider that Staff Regulation 4. 1 does not oblige the Secretary-General to transmit...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the issue of whether the staff member¡¯s application was pre-screened by a Human Resources Officer was irrelevant in determining whether his candidature received full and fair consideration. On the basis that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT failed to enquire as to what options were available to the staff member on Inspira at the time of application, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s findings that Inspira did not reflect the variety of the educational system of all the Member States equally and that the staff member¡¯s candidature had not been afforded full and fair...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT finding that the non-renewal decision constituted a separation decision for abandonment of post was not supported by the evidence and was, therefore, an error in fact and in law. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the evidence clearly established that the non-renewal decision was solely based on the Appellant¡¯s unauthorised absence from duty. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law in distinguishing Abdallah (judgment No. 2010-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-091) from the present case. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that there was overwhelming evidence that the Applicant did not meet his burden of proving that the Administration did not act...

On the delay before ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed that the delay was unfort±¬ÁÏÍøATe but held that the Applicant had not demonstrated that it was a procedural error affecting the outcome of the case. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in exercising its case management discretion when it refused the request for an oral hearing, but that this error did not affect the decision of the case. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err as there was clear and convincing evidence that the Applicant had committed sexual harassment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the disciplinary sanction of separation from service with compensation in lieu of notice and...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT properly reviewed the contested decision in accordance with the applicable law and established the critical facts of the case. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT had a broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence and the weight to be attached thereto and that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s conclusion was consistent with the evidence. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s conclusion that the impugned decision was unlawful was correct, albeit for different reasoning. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the facts underpinning the administrative decision to issue the staff member a...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that at the time of his separation from service, the former staff member was not married to his husband; their same-sex relationship did not enjoy similar status to marriage under the law of the US; the Regulations did not afford retrospective recognition of their marriage in 2018; and the Regulations specifically regulated the situation of the former staff member by providing for an annuity under Article 35ter. Therefore, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT concluded that under the express terms of Articles 34 and 35, the former staff member¡¯s spouse was not entitled to a survivor¡¯s benefit. Nonetheless, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT had before it an appeal by the Secretary-General. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law and fact leading to a manifestly unreasonable decision when it held that Mr Siddiqi had not threatened to kill identified staff members but only had made an unspecified threat to kill ¡°some¡± staff members. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the statements of the three witnesses rendered clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant did not only utter an unspecified threat but that he had threatened to kill identified staff members. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT also erred in law and fact when it concluded that threat was not serious...