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The Respondent submitted that the application was not receivable as the decision of 31 August 2011 was a reiteration of the decision given to the Applicant on 30 March 2009, before Sprauten ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2011/094. The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the decision of 31 August 2011 was made, or should have been made, pursuant to the directions and order of the Tribunal in Sprauten ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2011/094 (see paras. 87¨C88), and it thus cannot be viewed as a mere reiteration of the decision dated 30 March 2009. The purpose of the Tribunal¡¯s order in para. 87 of Sprauten ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2011/094 was to direct the Administration to make a new...

The Applicants have withdrawn the matter in finality, including on the merits. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT dismissed the application in its entirety without liberty to reinstate.

Receivability: The Tribunal considered whether it has the requisite jurisdiction to make a determination on an application for interpretation of an order as opposed to a final judgment. Noting that: (i) there is no provision in the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute or Rules of Procedure governing interpretation of orders or expressly prohibiting interpretation of a decision that is labeled ¡°Order¡±; and (ii) that regardless of whether decisions on applications for suspension of action are labeled as orders or judgments, they determine substantial issues, the Tribunal, pursuant to articles 19 and 36 of the Rules of...

The Tribunal found that art. 17 does not refer to an evaluation by a medical practitioner selected by the Administration in cases of requests for reconsideration and that the Administration failed to follow the correct procedure when it did not convene a medical board. It further noted that the Administration could not, under art. 17, use an independent medical evaluation by a practitioner established in the framework of the initial assessment of a disability benefit under the Pension Fund Regulations. The Tribunal further stressed that the independent medical evaluation failed to address the...

The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the Respondent¡¯s argument that no promise had been made was untenable. The evidence clearly indicated that ±¬ÁÏÍøOPS Managers knew the Applicant would rely on the statements they made to her in regards to a one year contract extension. The Respondent repeatedly disregarded its own rules and regulations in the course of completing the Applicant¡¯s performance appraisal and subsequently conducted a flawed rebuttal process which was biased and unfair and violated the Applicant¡¯s due process rights. Promises made created expectancy of renewal - It is untenable for the Administration...

The Applicant contests OSLA's decisions of 5 November 2013 not to represent him in two of the cases he had at the time pending at the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the application was receivable. It rejected the application on the merits, on the grounds that the decisions constituted a legal exercise of discretion on the part of OSLA, which had provided the Applicant with extensive legal assistance, had carefully considered all the issues and gave valid reasons on why it would not represent the Applicant. The Tribunal further found that the Applicant failed to provide evidence that OSLA...

The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not timely submit his request for management evaluation. Additionally, the Tribunal found that the Applicant failed to identify in clear and precise terms specific administrative decision(s), actions or omissions, including their dates. Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that the application was not receivable, ratione materiae.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal of ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Order No. 233, which contended that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT exceeded its competence in issuing an order as there was no matter for adjudication after Ms Chocobar withdrew her application. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, in making its Order in the absence of a case to adjudicate, lacked jurisdiction and exceeded its competence to a significant degree. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that Article 36 of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT RoP did not provide a legal basis for the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Order, as there was no case before ±¬ÁÏÍøDT to which Article 36 could apply. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT further noted that Article 36 does not allow ±¬ÁÏÍøDT to...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered Ms Das¡¯s application for Interpretation of judgment with respect to the award of interest on the compensatory damages and any remaining termination benefits and entitlements. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that its earlier jurisprudence held that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement becomes due, which in this case is the date of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that it had merely affirmed the award of compensatory damages and termination benefits by ±¬ÁÏÍøDT and had not initiated it. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that there was no merit to the Secretary-General¡¯s claim that...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered motions seeking execution of four judgments (judgment No. 2013-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-357, judgment No. 2013-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-359, judgment No. 2013-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-358, and judgment No. 2013-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-360). ±¬ÁÏÍøAT denied these motions, noting that execution did occur in each of the cases. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT also noted that payment of the moral damages had been effected and a new conversion process had been completed, thus, none of the applications merited an order for execution pursuant to Article 11(4) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute and Article 27 of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT RoP. With respect to Ademagic et al. and Mr Longone¡¯s motion to hold decision letters in...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered Mr Gakumba¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2013-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-387. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that it did not fulfil the statutory requirements and was seemingly disguised as an attempt to re-open the case. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that it would be manifestly unreasonable to submit that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDP Conversion Policy issued in 2010 could not be argued by the staff member in 2012 before the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, or in 2013 before ±¬ÁÏÍøAT. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that no valid reason had been provided about the untimely submission of the application for revision. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the application for revision.

As a preliminary matter, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing and considered his grounds of appeal. With respect to the claimed errors of procedure, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found no merit in the Appellant¡¯s arguments. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT was not persuaded that the Appellant suffered prejudice by ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT admitting the Commissioner-General¡¯s late reply, failing to translate the reply into Arabic, failing to lift the confidentiality order, or by failing to hold an oral hearing. However, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the Appellant had an unhealthy working relationship with...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred by concluding that ST/AI/2002/3 applied to ±¬ÁÏÍøICEF, as the ±¬ÁÏÍøICEF Handbook establishes the procedure that a staff member must follow should they wish to rebut the content of their performance report. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the principle articulated in Villamoran v. Secretary-General of the United Nations (2011-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-160), which holds that administrative issuances have greater legal authority over manuals such as the ±¬ÁÏÍøICEF Handbook, only where there is a conflict between guidelines and manuals and a properly promulgated...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal of judgment No. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2013/145. On the issue of whether ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law in not receiving the Appellant¡¯s application for revision of judgment, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that it did. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that to import into Article 12(1) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute the limitations presently advocated by ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, merely because of the inclusion of the word ¡°executable,¡± would be unduly restrictive and tantamount to a denial of an already narrowly construed remedy and unduly circumscribe the right of access of staff members to ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. With respect to the merits of the application for revision, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal as to whether Ms Carrabregu was eligible to be considered for a permanent appointment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the factual sequence clearly showed that Ms Carrabregu freely and willingly resigned from her service with ±¬ÁÏÍøDP to take up an appointment with a different entity (±¬ÁÏÍøV), thereby causing a break in service. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that this break in service should have led ±¬ÁÏÍøDT to uphold the administrative decision that Ms Carrabregu was not eligible for conversion to a permanent appointment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT further noted that Ms Carrabregu¡¯s service to ±¬ÁÏÍøV could not be...

As a preliminary matter, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT then considered the Appellant¡¯s claims that the facts were not established by clear and convincing evidence, that there were procedural flaws during the disciplinary proceedings, and that his separation from service was not warranted. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that clear and convincing evidence showed that the Appellant harassed all the alleged victims and abused his authority, in violation of WFP¡¯s Harassment Policy. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT also held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT correctly found that the sanction of separation from service was proportionate...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant did not succeed in establishing any error of fact or law which would warrant the reversal of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT correctly concluded that the termination of the Appellant¡¯s appointment was firmly supported by the evidence relative to the necessities of service in the context of a downsizing exercise, and no bias or improper purpose vitiated the impugned decision. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that as the Appellant did not effectively rebut the conclusions of the impugned judgment, he did not satisfy the burden of demonstrating that it was defective such as to...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal limited to the Appellant¡¯s claim that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in awarding costs against him. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the jurisdiction of a tribunal to award costs is narrowly restricted to instances where a party has manifestly abused the proceedings. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT gave no reasons for its determination that the Appellant had manifestly abused the proceedings, cited no evidence establishing that his application was frivolous or vexatious, or that he had deliberately delayed the proceedings, or had disobeyed an order of ±¬ÁÏÍøDT or had, in any other way, abused ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s proceedings. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant did not succeed in establishing any error of fact or law that would warrant reversal of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT correctly concluded that the non-selection of the Appellant was not vitiated by any improper motive. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that, even if the alleged flaws were to be considered irregularities, they would not be important enough to render the proceedings null or to reflect a violation of rights and actual harm or discrimination suffered by the Appellant. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that no compensation should be awarded to the Appellant, as no illegality or breach of...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered the Appellant¡¯s submission that she let the deadline elapse primarily because she was confused by the first sentence of the message she received from the Office of the Deputy High Commissioner. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that this circumstance was previously considered by ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT was satisfied that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s pronouncement was in accordance with the established case law. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT rejected the appeal.