{"id":204051,"date":"2008-06-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:41:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=204051"},"modified":"2019-03-12T18:41:55","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:41:55","slug":"auto-insert-204051","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-204051\/","title":{"rendered":"United Nations International Meeting on the Question of Palestine (Qawra, Malta, 3-4 June 2008) – Report – DPR publication"},"content":{"rendered":"
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±¬ÁÏÍøITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL MEETING<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n Qawra, Malta<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n 3 and 4 June 2008 <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n \n Contents<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Paragraphs<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n Page<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n I.<\/p>\n II.<\/p>\n III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Introduction<\/p>\n Opening session<\/p>\n Plenary sessions<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 1 – 4<\/p>\n 5 – 26<\/p>\n 27 – 70<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 3<\/p>\n 3<\/p>\n 9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n Plenary I<\/p>\n Plenary II<\/p>\n Plenary III<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 27 – 43<\/p>\n 44 – 58<\/p>\n 59 – 70<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 9<\/p>\n 13<\/p>\n 17<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n IV.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Closing session<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 71 – 78<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 20<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n Annexes<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n I.<\/p>\n II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Final document<\/p>\n List of participants<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 23<\/p>\n 25<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n \n <\/p>\n I<\/strong><\/span>. Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 1.\t<\/span>±¬ÁÏÍø International Meeting on the Question of Palestine was held in Qawra, Malta, on 3 and 4 June 2008, under the auspices of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and in keeping with General Assembly resolutions 62\/80 and 62\/81 of 10 December 2007. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 2.\t<\/span>The Committee was represented at the Meeting by a delegation comprising Paul Badji (Senegal), Chairman of the Committee; Saviour Borg (Malta), Rapporteur of the Committee; Habib Mansour (Tunisia); Angel Dalmau Fernández (Cuba); and Riyad Mansour (Palestine). <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 3.\t<\/span>The Meeting consisted of an opening session, three plenary sessions and a closing session. Presentations were made by 13 speakers, including Israeli and Palestinian speakers. In addition, representatives of 23 Governments, the Holy See and Palestine, as well as representatives of 3 intergovernmental organizations, 4 United Nations system entities, 4 civil society organizations and 12 media outlets participated in the Meeting (see annex II).<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 4.\t<\/span>The Meeting adopted a final document (see annex I).<\/p><\/div>\n II. Opening session<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 5.\t<\/span>The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta, Tonio Borg<\/strong>, said that Malta’s strategic relevance in the central Mediterranean had led the country to pursue a comprehensive and proactive foreign policy in the Euro-Mediterranean region which offered Malta another opportunity to further peace, security and stability across this geostrategic region, including the Middle East. As an active and ardent proponent of peace in the Middle East, Malta had long been a supporter of a two-State solution to the Middle East conflict between Israel and Palestine. He reiterated Malta’s support for a speedy end to the occupation of the Palestinian territory and the creation of an independent Palestinian State.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 6.\t<\/span>Mr. Borg stated that only by creating an atmosphere that was conducive to peace in the Middle East could constructive steps be taken to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Middle East stalemate was not only detrimental to the region itself but was also having a negative impact upon regional relations across the Mediterranean area. The European Union recognized that it needed to assume an increasingly active political role in the region; it was already a major economic player in the Middle East and should seek to play just as important a political role. Malta’s decisive foreign policy towards the Middle East through its bilateral and multilateral channels of diplomacy had thus to be seen as an effort to secure peace in the region. It was only by working together through Euro-Mediterranean diplomatic initiatives such as the Barcelona Process, the “Five plus Five” forum, the European Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, which was headquartered in Malta, that a permanent settlement to the Middle East conflict would be achieved. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 7.\t<\/span>He continued that one could not leave the open wound of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unaddressed. The State of Israel was rightly recognized by all. The State of Palestine needed to come into being at the earliest opportunity. The primary objective of the international community must be to achieve peace in the region and simultaneously guarantee the right to exist for the State of Israel. While peace in the Middle East did not guarantee peace in the rest of the Mediterranean, there could be no peace in the Mediterranean without peace in the Middle East. Mr. Borg indicated that a concerted strategy that focused on trying to help Israel and the Palestinians forge a common ground despite their clear differences should be the driving force at that particularly sensitive juncture. Geographical proximity and stability in the region dictated that the European Union needed to try to influence regional dynamics in the Middle East more systematically than in recent years. Strategic thinking was not enough in itself to make a difference on the ground, however. As experience had consistently demonstrated, decisive results were only achieved when verbal commitments were matched by appropriate resources. Only by creating an atmosphere that was conducive to peace in the Middle East could constructive steps be taken to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By continually contributing to the creation of such a context, Malta had assisted in helping facilitate the task of reactivating peace efforts in the Middle East. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 8.\t<\/span>The statement of the <\/strong>Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, <\/strong>was read out by his representative at the Meeting, Maxwell Gaylard, United Nations Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and United Nations coordinator for humanitarian and development activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. He said that the Meeting was taking place at a time when the international community had intensified its efforts to help Israelis and Palestinians reach a peace treaty. The parameters of such an agreement were clear: an end to the occupation that began in 1967, an end to conflict and the establishment of a sovereign, viable and independent Palestinian State living side by side in peace with a secure Israel. To succeed, current efforts to achieve a peace deal needed to be underpinned by visible progress on the ground. Both sides had to seize the current window of opportunity to push the peace process forward, especially by acting on their obligations under the Road Map. Some actions had already been taken, but much more remained to be done. Continuing settlement activity contravened both international law and Israel’s obligations under the Road Map. Also, the construction of the barrier in the Occupied Palestinian Territory contravened the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Those activities had to cease at once. On the Palestinian side, efforts to improve capacity and performance on security and the rule of law should continue. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 9.\t<\/span>There was a particularly urgent need to develop a different and more positive strategy for Gaza. The Palestinian people, especially the 1.5 million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, endured punishing humanitarian conditions. Two thirds of Gaza’s residents subsisted in poverty, and economic growth had stood at zero the previous year. Continuing Israeli air and ground operations only aggravated that situation, resulting in unacceptable casualties among Palestinian civilians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Equally unacceptable and deeply irresponsible were the rocket and other attacks by militants against Israeli civilians and at crossing point. The Secretary-General reiterated his call for the cessation of all such condemnable acts of violence and for all parties to comply with international humanitarian law. In particular, measures of collective punishment should cease immediately.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 10.\t<\/span>In his statement, the Secretary-General commended Egypt for its efforts to achieve calm in the Gaza Strip and also welcomed the reaffirmation of the Arab Peace Initiative, which was a central element in the quest for peace in the region. He urged strong Arab support for the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, to build its institutions and to advance Palestinian unity. He added that the coming months would be critical to the collective efforts to restore hope to the Palestinians and said that he would remain closely involved in the peace process, both personally and through the Quartet and the efforts of the United Nations Special Coordinator. The international community had to do everything possible to help ensure a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on full implementation of relevant United Nations resolutions and the requirements under the Road Map.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 11.\t<\/span>The Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Paul Badji<\/strong>, said that participants had gathered in Malta to discuss obstacles facing the parties in advancing the peace process. One of the principal obstacles in the way of the political process was the presence of settlements and outposts in the occupied West Bank, along with the associated infrastructure serving the needs of the settler population. The presence of settlements in an occupied territory was illegal under international law. The most intensive settlement expansion was taking place in and around East Jerusalem. The Committee considered that no agreement that did not include East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian State could bring about a sustainable settlement of the conflict. Another disturbing factor was the presence of the separation wall, which cut deep into the West Bank, enveloping large settlement blocks. This was viewed as an indication of Israel’s intention to unilaterally determine its borders with a future Palestinian State, prejudging the outcome of the permanent status negotiations. In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the highest international judicial body, had clearly stated that the wall was illegal under international law. By utilizing legal and institutional tools, the international community could challenge the presence of the wall more vigorously. He added that there were many other forms of movement restriction in place in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that made sustainable economic activity simply impossible for the Palestinians. The important development projects currently under way, aimed at boosting the economy, would inevitably end up as mere temporary remedies. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 12.\t<\/span>Mr. Badji stated that the question of Palestine refugees remained a core permanent status issue that could not be neglected in any peace agreement negotiation, since it had been a major element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its fair and just resolution should be an essential prerequisite for peace. Mr. Badji said that of great concern was the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular in the Gaza Strip, where the civilian population suffered from routine Israeli military raids targeting rocket-launching operations, as well as from the humanitarian crisis caused by total closures. He added that the Committee unequivocally condemned the killing of innocent civilians by both sides, either in Israeli military operations or as a result of rocket fire from Gaza, but at the same time considered it totally unacceptable and unjust that the entire civilian population of the Gaza Strip was enduring collective punishment and was subjected to a suffocating blockade for the actions of a few militant groups. The Committee reiterated that Israel, as the occupying Power, was obligated under the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect civilians under its occupation and was responsible for providing basic services, such as food and medical care, and ensuring the overall welfare of the population. The applicability of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory had been repeatedly confirmed by the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The Gaza Strip was no exception, with Israel fully controlling not only the entry and exit of people and goods but also every single aspect of the daily life of the population. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 13.\t<\/span>Mr. Badji emphasized that the Committee was advocating the creation of a climate conducive to the advancement of permanent status negotiations between the parties and supported all efforts in that regard. On the ground, that required, first of all, a complete cessation of all acts of violence, such as military attacks, destruction and acts of terror. The Committee firmly believed that the unity of the Palestinian people was an essential condition for achieving a viable resolution of the question of Palestine. It was of the view that Europe should also play a more active role in the current political process. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 14.\t<\/span>The Deputy Speaker of the Palestine National Council and the representative of Palestine, Tayseer Quba<\/strong>, said that there had been significant developments in the months that had passed since the important Annapolis and Paris Conferences, held in November and December 2007, respectively. A central factor in that period which had witnessed the revival of the Middle East peace process and the relaunching of bilateral negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, had been the international community’s support. The Annapolis Conference had brought together representatives from around the world and had brought the two sides together. Mr. Quba stated that the key role of the Arab Peace Initiative must be recognized and seized upon in the effort to build momentum, promote progress and advance the process. Annapolis had been followed by a timely international donor meeting in Paris to mobilize donor assistance to the Palestinian Authority in order to enable it to build the foundations for a prosperous and viable Palestinian State. The donor meeting also allowed the alleviation of the socio-economic and humanitarian crisis being faced by the Palestinian people as a result of years of destruction of the Palestinian economy, the imposition of severe closures and restrictions on the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and devastating sanctions. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 15.\t<\/span>Mr. Quba said that, regrettably, the reality on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was not nearly as positive and that there had been little progress in negotiations because of Israeli actions that were destabilizing the situation on the ground and creating even more challenges. Instead of truly turning a new page and embarking on the path to peace, Israel never ceased pursuing illegal practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, obstructing tangible progress. The deadly and destructive military assaults and the measures of collective punishment that continued to be carried out against the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip were starkly illustrative of the relentless Israeli onslaught against Palestinian human rights that continued to incite and fuel the dreaded cycle of violence between the two sides. After Annapolis, Israel had continued and intensified settlement construction in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in East Jerusalem. Such illegal actions only further provoked and reignited violence and destabilized the situation on the ground, poisoning the environment and endangering peace efforts. Following its declaration of the Gaza Strip as a “hostile entity” in September 2007, the occupying Power had intensified its siege through the continued closure of all border crossings, the obstruction of the access and movement of people and goods, including humanitarian, food, medical and building supplies, and also through the steep reduction of fuel and electricity supplies. The situation in the West Bank, while not as grave, also remained of great concern because of the severe restrictions Israel continued to impose on the movement of people and goods through hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks, which debilitated Palestinian socio-economic life and recovery. While a few hundred prisoners had been released, the daily arrest campaigns carried out by Israel maintained the number of Palestinians in Israeli jails and detention centres at nearly 11,000 people, including hundreds of children and women.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 16.\t<\/span>Mr. Quba stated that those were serious issues that must be addressed if the international community wanted to bring about a real change in the situation on the ground and between the two sides, for their continuation ensured only the deterioration of the situation and the weakening of the forces of peace. He said that the region was at a crossroads, where there was a historic opportunity to advance the Middle East peace process towards the goal of a just, peaceful settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict with the achievement of an end to the Israeli occupation. The international community, including the Security Council, had clear responsibilities to shoulder if peace and security were to become more than mere words in the region. <\/p><\/div>\n Statements by representatives of Governments, intergovernmental organizations<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n and the United Nations system<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 17.\t<\/span>The representative of Cuba<\/strong>, speaking on behalf of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that the Movement kept the follow-up to the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as one of its priority agenda items and that the question of Palestine was the key to the problems in the Middle East. As long as that question remained unresolved, the pockets of tension in the region would continue to proliferate. The Movement was highly concerned at the critical situation on the ground and the obstacles to relaunching the peace process in the region. It rejected all attempts to alter the attributes of the peace process, as well as the implementation of unilateral measures aimed at imposing a unilateral and illegal solution by Israel. Israel had to put an end to the illegitimate and illegal occupation and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the illegal construction of the separation wall, which were aimed at confiscating and annexing Palestinian land and property and at modifying the demographic and geographic character of the Palestinian Territory. A policy that was based on unilateral acts would never resolve the conflict. The acts carried out on the ground, including the construction of the Wall or the settlements, only contributed to exacerbating resentment and increasing distrust. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 18.\t<\/span>Notwithstanding the recent efforts of the international community to rekindle the peace process in the region, the Movement was concerned at the critical situation on the ground and the lack of hope for advancing towards a just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine. After the Annapolis Conference and the Donors Conference in Paris, some had predicted that sustained progress in the peace process in the Middle East would take place. Unfortunately, reality had proved completely different. He said that the lukewarm hope for advancements in the peace process following the Annapolis Conference and the Donors Conference in Paris had quickly waned as a result of the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground, particularly in the Gaza Strip, owing to the recent illegal measures taken by Israel against Palestinian civilians. The current situation did not benefit anyone, not even the people of Israel, who also suffered the consequences of their Government’s policies. To overcome those factors, the Movement had repeatedly urged the Quartet to continue to work actively with both parties to carry forward direct negotiations and encourage immediate steps on the ground to promote a genuine resumption of the peace process. The Movement called on Israel to immediately cease its aggression, withdraw its troops from Gaza, abide by its obligations under the Geneva Convention and stop the illegal construction of the separation wall as well as other unilateral actions. The Security Council must also act to fulfil its responsibilities to protect the civilian population in Gaza. He pledged that the Movement would continue to contribute to the achievement of a just and lasting peace based on all relevant United Nations resolutions and other internationally recognized agreements.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 19.\t<\/span>The representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference<\/strong> (OIC) said that Palestinians were still suffering in the Gaza Strip because of Israeli restrictions which had given rise to a humanitarian crisis. He urged the lifting of the embargo and called upon the international community to put pressure on Israel regarding its continued incursions, restrictions, assassinations and other aggressions in the West Bank. He demanded that Israel stop those practices, as well as the expansion of settlements and the building of the separation wall, so that the State of Palestine could be created, ending the suffering of the Palestinian people and restoring their right of self-determination. He reiterated OIC’s support to the Palestinian people in the realization of their inalienable rights and voiced support for the Committee’s efforts towards helping that come about.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 20.\t<\/span>The representative of Malaysia<\/strong> said that it was time to take a clear look at the situation in the Middle East. Despite recent diplomatic events and the glimmer of hope raised by the Annapolis and Paris conferences, which had seemed to echo the resolve of the international community to settle the core issues, it was clear that Israel regularly engaged in provocations to prevent a final settlement of the question. There should be no preconditions for the resumption of negotiations. He expressed concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation, especially in the Gaza Strip. A stronger international focus on negotiations to achieve a settlement was needed, as was humanitarian aid for Gazans. He said that the Committee should exercise its influence on the Security Council to make sure that Israel changed its practices. In addition, Palestinians must unite in order to be able to establish their sovereign State.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 21.\t<\/span>The representative of Tunisia<\/strong> emphasized the moral need to support an agreement towards the establishment of the Palestinian State by the deadline of the end of the year. World peace would not be achieved until the Middle East conflict had been resolved. Although the Annapolis conference had given rise to a lot of hope, the situation on the ground had been allowed to deteriorate. There had been a multiplication of control barriers and other obstacles set up by Israel to prevent the reunification of families. That was not favouring peace. He indicated that settlement activity must also cease and that prisoners must be released. The representative of Tunisia called upon all influential parties, including the Quartet, to redouble their efforts to end the conflict and set out on the road to peace. It was time for the Palestinian people, who had suffered so much, to gain their own State.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 22.\t<\/span>The representative of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Middle East<\/strong> of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean<\/strong> said that Malta had long held the rapporteurship of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and had remained deeply engaged on the question. His organization had promoted interparliamentary dialogue to move the issue forward. He described the inception and the work of the Assembly’s Committee on the Middle East, the approach of which would be innovative, through interchange with people from the area and experts on specific issues. Among the measures to be taken by the Ad Hoc Committee were the monitoring of the situation on the ground and visits to the Middle East in order to collect the facts first-hand and speak to the parties and civil society. The Ad Hoc Committee would also be action-oriented, with suggestions and recommendations, engage civil society and serve as a catalyst for a new approach. It was determined that the Committee would not take sides, apportion blame or engage in empty talk but would be an action-oriented catalyst for a solution to the problems. He stressed that his organization could help mediate but that it was up to the parties themselves to compromise and come through on their commitments.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 23.\t<\/span>The Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean<\/strong> said that it was the intention of the Assembly to reaffirm the key role of its members in addressing their common interests and create an era of peace, security and prosperity for all. The objective was to create a stable and prosperous Mediterranean with common values and shared aspirations, as well as a forum for political and economic cooperation and dialogue among cultures and civilizations. Some of the common problems faced by the region were globalization, energy, water, migration, occupation, terrorism and trafficking. Lack of peace was the main problem with regard to the process of ensuring security, stability and development of the Mediterranean area, which had the lowest level of direct foreign investment while a huge amount of resources was spent for armament and military purposes. A key objective was for Israel and the Palestinians to reach a just and lasting peace. The organization hoped to build trust between the parties for that purpose, and stressed that it had great concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza in particular, where he urged access for humanitarian staff. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 24.\t<\/span>The representative of Madagascar<\/strong> said that the Middle East situation was the most complex and burning issue of the day but that the various agreements and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly had not produced any positive effects. There had been some positive developments, such as the recognition by other parties of Israel, together with its right to exist within safe borders alongside a State of Palestine; however, the hope created by the Road Map was practically at a standstill, and the suffering continued. He said that the establishment of settlements and the building of the separation wall violated international law. Although he recognized the right of Israel to defend itself and protect its people, it should not violate international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which affects all aspects of life. International law should be inviolable, and humane treatment should be given to civilians under occupation. The diplomatic developments of recent months were encouraging, however, and it was now up to the two protagonists of the Middle East situation to create the conditions for living together in harmony. There should be a coexistence of two States, living side by side in peace and with Jerusalem as the capital of both States. That would require a stop in settlement activity. He concluded by saying that the Road Map opened a real opportunity for peace in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 25.\t<\/span>The representative of China<\/strong> stated that the question of Palestine was at the centre of the Middle East issue. China appealed to both parties to seize the opportunity, demonstrate a longer perspective to show flexibility, steadily promote the peace process and reach common understanding at an early date. He said that China was concerned about the persistent violent confrontations in the Gaza Strip and appealed to all parties jointly to adopt positive measures for a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire arrangement as soon as possible. Israel should completely lift its blockade on Gaza and take more action to improve the humanitarian situation and freedom of movement. China firmly supported the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and hoped that the concerned parties, on the basis of related United Nations resolutions, the principle of "land for peace", the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative, would resolve the disputes through political negotiations, establish an independent Palestinian State and realize the peaceful coexistence of the Palestinians and Israel. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China would continue making efforts to push forward for a comprehensive and just solution of the Palestine issue at an early date.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 26.\t<\/span>The representative of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme <\/strong>(±¬ÁÏÍø-Habitat)<\/strong> said that a number of housing initiatives had been pursued by the Palestinian Authority since the early 1990s but that currently there was no coherent housing policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, even though there was a shortage of acceptable housing. ±¬ÁÏÍø-Habitat was therefore submitting proposals for that purpose, working with both Israeli and Palestinian local authorities. He described some of those proposals and thanked donors for their funding.<\/p><\/div>\n III. Plenary sessions<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Plenary I<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n Meeting Road Map commitments <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 27.\t<\/span>The President Emeritus of Malta, Guido de Marco<\/strong>, said it was a privilege for him to address the Meeting, in particular on the issue of the settlements and their impact on the Palestinian population, the issue of the settlements in terms of the Road Map and the consequences of settlement construction for the territorial integrity and contiguity of the future Palestinian State. He said that there could be no peace in the Mediterranean unless the Palestinian and Middle East issues were resolved. Unless the Middle East issue was resolved, however, there could be no real understanding between Europe and the Arab world, or between Europe and Israel itself. As President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990, he had visited Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jordan. He recalled how Israeli police had watched settlers trying to overturn his car on the road between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Mr. de Marco said that one of the most important objectives, without which a Palestinian State would never be a reality, was to stop settlement activity. The settlements were an important point in Oslo; it was necessary to stop the settlements because they were intended to prevent the State of Palestine from ever becoming a reality. When overflying the West Bank, his attention had been drawn to the strategic placement of settlements and the roads linking them, which was such that there could never be a State of Palestine. During a visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, he had been told that Palestinians were suffering the humiliation of being refugees in their own country and also of seeing the construction of settlements on their land. Unless something was done now, another chance for peace would be lost. He said that the late Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat had asked him to tell the Europeans that they could do much more for Israeli-Palestinian peace and that the Americans were doing what they could under the circumstances. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 28.\t<\/span>Mr. de Marco said that Malta was today part of the European Union. It was a small country but was very relevant in the European Union because it brought in the Mediterranean dimension. As far back as the first Helsinki meeting, the Maltese had been saying that there would be no security in Europe unless there was security in the Mediterranean, and that there could be no security in the Mediterranean unless there was security in Europe. That had been stated at the height of the Cold War, and it was still a reality today, when the Cold War was being spoken about in the past tense. His plea to fellow members of the European Union was to defend and work for peace in the Middle East. Mr. de Marco noted that Malta had held the rapporteurship of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People since its inception. Some claimed that that was not in accord with some European Union policies, which was not true since it also dealt with the rights and interests of the European Union and Israel. Mr. de Marco stressed that peace could be achieved and had to be achieved. The presence of the participants in the Meeting testified to their belief in the inalienable rights not only of the Palestinian people but of all peoples to have a country of their own, and to their respect for the rights of other countries. The region should move together in a Euro-Mediterranean process combining the capacities of the industrialized States of Europe and the human resources, oil and gas resources of the Middle East. There were three commonalities in the Mediterranean: common interests, common concerns and common heritage. If the peoples built upon those three commonalities, the Palestinian people, as an independent and sovereign people, would also be able to become a part of the region in friendship with Israel, in friendship with other Arab nations and in friendship with Europe. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 29.\t<\/span>The Director of Peace Now’s Settlement Watch Project, Hagit Ofran, <\/strong>said that the settlement activity of Israel in the West Bank would determine either the success of the peace process or its failure. As an Israeli, she was working with the Peace Now movement, a group of people trying to persuade Israelis and their Government to move for peace, because they had concluded that settlements were one of the biggest obstacles to peace. The organization had decided to create a project to monitor all settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza in order to make sure that the Israeli public and all interested people in the rest of the world knew what was going on. Ms. Ofran said that there were two short sentences in the Road Map about settlements. The first meant the evacuation of outposts that had been settlements established by Israel but not officially, a trick devised by the Government of Israel since the 1990s, when it had decided not to build new settlements. Therefore, it did not build settlements officially but unofficially, calling them unauthorized settlements or illegal outposts. The Road Map only referred to those outposts established after March 2001 because then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared that he would only take responsibility for those outposts which he had established or was responsible for. She opined that the Road Map was tailor-made to suit Mr. Sharon and what the two sides could have agreed on at the time. As a result, the Quartet accepted Mr. Sharon’s argument and said that, for the purposes of the Road Map, it was sufficient to consider only those outposts established after March 2001. The second clause regarding settlements in the Road Map was simple: freeze all settlement activity. Presenting statistics, she indicated that, since the signing of the Road Map, at least 8,700 new housing units had been constructed and approximately 55,000 new settlers had been added in the West Bank. No illegal outposts that should have been removed had been removed; most had been expanded, and at least seven new outposts had been established.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 30.\t<\/span>In East Jerusalem, the number had to be much higher, although it was much harder to find data from official governmental sources. At least 3,000 new housing units had been started, people had been added and at least 3,500 new tenders for construction had been issued. She made the distinction between East Jerusalem and the West Bank because she wanted to stress that for the Israeli public, of which Peace Now was a part and which it was trying to influence, Jerusalem was different from the West Bank, because Israel had officially annexed East Jerusalem. Unlike in the West Bank, which was not annexed and where Palestinians had no rights at all, in East Jerusalem Israel gave certain rights to the Palestinians and had announced officially that it was part of Israel. For the Israeli public, it was like a symbol, a myth: Jerusalem was united and had to be kept united, and whoever started to speak against the unification of Jerusalem would be a traitor.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 31.\t<\/span>Ms. Ofran expressed the view that the Road Map had failed totally. The two sides were hanging on to the Road Map as if they were committed to it; however, not even an attempt had been made to implement it. Israel did not annex the West Bank because of all the Palestinians living there; however, it wanted the land, so it had built a lot of settlements and brought in a lot of settlers. The main problem with the Oslo Agreement was that it was an interim agreement. Settlements were to be removed in the endgame, and that was the biggest mistake. For the sake of all of the settlements, the two sides had divided the West Bank into three areas: areas A and B under Palestinian control and area C, the vast majority of the land, under Israeli control. On the map, there were settlements with some enclaves of the Palestinian Authority. As a result, a lot of settlers had come to the West Bank after Oslo, more than had come before. What was currently the biggest settlement in the West Bank, “Modi’in Ilit”, was actually established after Oslo. Those facts brought about much despair on the Palestinian side and a lack of faith that Israelis meant to go towards peace. Also, many Israelis had lost faith in the Oslo process, blaming increased Palestinian violent acts and the outbreak of the second intifada.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 32.\t<\/span>She recalled that Israel had argued that the settlements had to be protected and that it had put up hundreds of roadblocks and checkpoints. She indicated that only 35 checkpoints, out of several hundred, were actually meant to protect Israel. All the rest were meant to control Palestinians and to protect the settlers. Next came the separation barrier, which was meant to protect not only Israel but mainly settlements. It had created huge enclaves that Israel was going to annex. The fence was a huge investment: mountains had been cut for it. Millions of dollars were being invested. Despite the Road Map, there was no real change on the ground in terms of checkpoints and roadblocks. What mattered was freezing settlement activity. The majority of the Israeli public had already given up on the territories. The majority did not want settlement expansion and was not interested in it; however, Israel was still building. She opined that the Road Map had not worked from the outset, and making it the reference point for negotiations in Annapolis had meant the prevention of any progress. The only context in which the Israelis would support evacuation, even unilaterally, as had been demonstrated in Gaza, which the majority of Israelis supported, was not in the context of giving something to the Palestinians in order to stabilize the situation but in the context of a plan to move forward with the final status agreement, maybe along the lines of the Geneva Accord. She concluded by saying that the pressure should be put on the endgame and not on more and more interim measures.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 33.\t<\/span>Geoffrey Aronson<\/strong>, director of research and publications at the Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington, D.C., and editor of the Foundation’s bimonthly Report on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories<\/i>, recalled that when he had first visited the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1976, there had been fewer than 10,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and approximately 40,000 to 50,000 Israelis living in the areas of Jerusalem occupied by Israel in June 1967. He described the developments since as a contest over control of land. Settlers and settlements were an instrument in that contest. To the extent that settlements expanded and their needs and requirements expanded, it reflected progressively the extent to which Palestinian everyday life was compromised and the prospects for the creation of a Palestinian national and sovereign existence were compromised. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 34.\t<\/span>Analysing the historical development of settlements, he stressed that the Jewish communities that had been established before Israel’s formal creation in 1948 had been vital in establishing the perimeters of Jewish sovereignty. After the war of 1967, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the security establishment as a whole had believed that the IDF’s presence in the territories in June 1967 was vital to the defence of the nation and that Israel could not easily be defended in the absence of an Israeli presence in those occupied territories. Therefore, in the context of the post-1967 period, settlers and settlements had become an instrument of an Israeli security doctrine, which had enabled the IDF to deploy beyond its borders, and deploy in such a way that was politically palatable for the Israeli political system. The creation of settlements had enabled the politicians to say that Israel was not defending occupied territory but the homeland. It had also been very convenient and important that the territory happened to be part of Israel’s own historical sense of identity. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 35.\t<\/span>The Oslo years had been very important for facilitating the expansion of settlements. As the number of settlers had approached half a million, including in areas of annexed Jerusalem, those communities themselves had generated requirements that might be independent and which had required their expansion. The protection of those settlements had become an issue of national security in itself. That had become evident in the route of the separation barrier that snaked east of the Green Line.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 36.\t<\/span>There were examples, however, of the fact that Israel’s own security interests could be modified. They were modified with certain repercussions for Palestinian sovereignty. He referred to events in the West Bank in the context of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2004 and 2005. In the West Bank, Israel had withdrawn from and evacuated only four small settlements. The security doctrine had not changed, meaning IDF remained basically exactly where they had been. As a consequence, settlements had been removed and evacuated, but there had been no concomitant increase in the ability of Palestinians to reap advantage from that evacuation because the security doctrine had not changed and the classification of those areas as “Area C” had not changed. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 37.\t<\/span>Turning to the Gaza Strip, he pointed out that Israel’s evacuation of the Gaza Strip had not been first and foremost a decision to evacuate settlements. It had been a decision to reorient Israel’s security doctrine. It had been a decision that suggested that Israeli security could be advanced through evacuation and that settlements had no value because there was no rationale for Israel to remain in the occupied territory in Gaza. Years before, a similar decision had been the foundation for Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt. It would also be the foundation for its treaty with the Syrian Arab Republic at some point. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 38.\t<\/span>Turning to the West Bank, he said that it was very relevant to Israeli strategic security. He called upon Israel to undertake a consequent rethinking of its security interests, or justification, for remaining in the Jordan Valley. He said that, in the current strategic environment in the Middle East, there was no strategic rationale for its deployment in the Jordan Valley, no compelling one that couldn’t be addressed in other ways; however, the settlement enterprise in the West Bank and in Jerusalem over the past 40 years had created an interest in and of itself owing to the success of the programme. Those facts on the ground created an environment that wasn’t subject to a changed Israeli security doctrine. He would not have an easy answer to that. He acknowledged that settlements were essential for Israel’s security doctrine; however, what needed to be addressed was Israel’s understanding of its own security interests not only in Israel, not only in the West Bank, but in the region beyond. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 39.\t<\/span>Alon Ben-Meir<\/strong>, professor of international relations and Middle East studies at New York University and Director of the Middle East desk at the Institute on Global Politics at the New School for Social Research, said that 30 years ago he had advocated for the necessity of a two-State solution and had received threats from both sides. Since Oslo, that solution had gained a lot of currency, but there were contradictions in the support for it. Many Israelis, for example, supported a Palestinian State but did not oppose settlements. Each new construction in settlements was “a nail in the coffin” of the idea of a Palestinian State. At the same time, many Palestinians supported a two-State solution and at the same time supported the right of return for Palestinian refugees, which would immediately obliterate the State of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 40.\t<\/span>Seconding the critique of settlements given by the previous speakers, he analysed the impediments to the Road Map. One was the internal political struggle within the Palestinian community, which needed to be addressed without delay. Hamas, as well as extremists in Israel, were not willing to accept the two-State solution, instead either dreaming of recovering the entire Palestine or believing in the notion of Greater Israel. Another problem was that extremists had usurped the agenda to control what was happening on both sides and that moderates on each side were placating them instead of isolating the radicals. Israel could do many things to empower Mahmoud Abbas and other moderates. The United States of America, in addition, could equip and train a serious security force for the Palestinian Authority, even if the Israelis objected. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 41.\t<\/span>Mr. Ben-Meir indicated that the perpetuation of violence as a political tool by both sides was another big problem. The rocket fire from Gaza and the subsequent military retaliations had destroyed any trust that had existed. He said that violence was the mother of all evils, the number one, two and three issue. The Israelis had to separate negotiations from terrorism and Palestinians had to learn that there was nothing to be gained by violence. Both sides would have to control violence in order to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations that could lead to a solution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 42.\t<\/span>He pointed out that it had also been a mistake to ignore major players in the region, particularly on the part of the Americans, who were a crucial part of any peace process. The American administration, for example, had tried to isolate the Syrian Arab Republic, and that country had reacted by supporting militant groups. In addition, the American Administration had sent out too many emissaries without any criteria for concrete results. The situation was at a crossroads now because there would be a new American Administration soon. That Administration should be tackling the Middle East problem from day one. He advocated contacting the candidates to emphasize the priority of the issue. It was also vital for all stakeholders to embrace the Arab Peace Initiative. That was an Arab Initiative, resonating better on the Arab street throughout the Middle East than any proposals from outside the region. He stressed that the Arab Initiative was comprehensive, did not exclude countries like the Syrian Arab Republic and represented the collective Arab will. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 43.\t<\/span>In conclusion, he warned that it was most important to prevent Israeli and Palestinian extremists from bringing about another generation of suffering. Sixty years was already too long. Israelis and Palestinians were either doomed or destined to live together, and the only good choice was the establishment of a viable, democratic, free Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza, living side by side with the State of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n Plenary II<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n The wall in the Occupied West Bank<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 44.\t<\/span>Thierry Delbreuve, <\/strong>Officer-in-Charge of the Geographical Coordination and Monitoring Section of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Geneva, spoke about the wall in the Occupied West Bank, including its structure, route and the problems that it caused, while stressing that Israel had the right, indeed the duty, to protect its citizens against attacks. He said that the construction of the wall had started in June 2002 and comprised two forms: pre-cast concrete slabs, usually 9 m in height in urban areas, especially Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and 80 per cent of it in electronic “fence” form, varying between 30 m and 80 m in width, which included razor wire, trenches, military roads and sand paths to detect footprints. In the northern West Bank, the wall was augmented by a buffer zone with a much wider environmental footprint, particularly in terms of the uprooting of olive trees and the destruction of irrigation systems, as it cut through Palestinian farmland. He noted that objections to the barrier were not about its structure but concerned its route, which was declared contrary to international law in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered in July 2004. Had the barrier been built along the 320 km Green Line, representing the 1949 ceasefire demarcation, or inside Israel, there would have been no objections from the standpoint of international law, nor would it have had any of the humanitarian consequences. At 720 km, the official route of the barrier approved by the Israeli Knesset was more than double the length of the Green Line, and over 80 per cent went through the West Bank. The wall’s most intrusive parts were the two “fingers” in the northern West Bank, one of which went 22 km inside the West Bank. In the area of East Jerusalem, the barrier went 14 km east of the Green Line, isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, which had major implications for humanitarian access and transportation links between the West Bank’s northern and southern parts. Bethlehem, which was already cut off from Jerusalem, would also be cut off from most of its agricultural land.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 45.\t<\/span>Mr. Delbreuve indicated that about 60 per cent of the wall had been completed, 10 per cent was under construction and 30 per cent was planned but not yet constructed. He said that, if the barrier were to be built according to its present route, approximately 9.5 per cent of the West Bank would be isolated and physically joined to Israel. Israeli authorities had described the wall as solely a temporary security measure, with no intention to redraw the Green Line or to annex land; however, all major settlement blocks that Israel wanted to retain following a resolution of the conflict were to the west of the barrier and encompassed more than 80 per cent of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while 20 per cent would remain on the “Palestinian” side of the barrier. Mr. Delbreuve provided a number of examples and said that the route of the wall had clearly been determined to benefit settlers <\/strong>and not the Palestinian population and that it allowed for the future expansion of settlements at the expense of Palestinian communities. The route of the barrier isolated five Palestinian communities on its “Israeli” side, separating them from the rest of the West Bank. In October 2003, the area between the barrier and the Green Line in the northern West Bank, the so-called “seam zone”, had been declared closed by military order, and the people living there required “permanent resident” permits to continue living in their own homes and on their own land. Mr. Delbreuve pointed out that some 50,000 West Bank Palestinians would be located between the barrier and the Green Line. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, only about 20 per cent of those who used to work on the land in the closed area before the wall had been built had received “visitor” permits. Farmers were prohibited from staying on their land overnight; they and anyone else needing to cross to the other side of the barrier were subject to a complex regime of gates, with restrictions imposed on vehicles and agricultural equipment and materials crossing through the gates, with the result that “agricultural communities were losing contact with the land on which they depended both for their present livelihood and for their future survival”. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 46.\t<\/span>The Director-General of the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, Jad Isaac<\/strong>, said that his organization was monitoring Israeli settlements as part of a project that was supported by the European Union and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. In 2002 Israel had begun implementing a unilateral segregation plan in the West Bank, but the route had changed a great deal since then, with the area isolated from the rest of the West Bank getting larger each time. A total of 138 villages would be affected, with 29 of them totally isolated inside the seam zone. He called the blocks thus created “reservations” that would contain 309,000 Palestinians, including the 258,000 residents of East Jerusalem. The segregated areas also included 28 wells and 31 springs in the western zone, as well as 121 wells and 31 springs isolated in the eastern zone. Up to 28 per cent of West Bank agricultural areas would be isolated in both zones. Bethlehem and Jerusalem had been separated for the first time in history, and Nablus was an envelope surrounded by checkpoints. He deplored that that was all happening with the acquiescence of the international community despite the ruling of ICJ.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 47.\t<\/span>He pointed out that the wall had nothing to do with security but was instead a grab for land and water to accommodate the settlements, segregate Jerusalem from the West Bank, delineate unilaterally the boundaries between Israel and a Palestinian State and convert that future entity into Bantustans or cantons. Separate roads assured the retention of Jerusalem and the persistence of an apartheid system. He quoted Israeli leaders repeatedly vowing that settlement blocks would never be returned. If a Palestinian State was created based on the facts that had been created on the ground, it could only consist of isolated cantonments linked by tunnels. The international community had a moral responsibility to stop those violations of international law.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 48.\t<\/span>Mr. Isaac emphasized that the segregation plan was being unilaterally implemented at an accelerated pace, in defiance of international legitimacy. The plan was intended to squeeze as many Palestinians as possible onto as little land as possible and establish an apartheid system that denied Palestinians their basic human rights. The pretext of security had been used as an excuse to grab Palestinian land and water. The real driver behind the plan was the accommodation of settlements and the creation of a mediocre Palestinian entity that would not be sustainable. He opined that a new declaration of principles, or shelved agreements, or frameworks for final status negotiations were a waste of time, and so were public relations meetings and conferences. The international community had a moral responsibility to stop Israel’s continued defiance of United Nations resolutions, including the ICJ ruling. Marginalizing the role of the United Nations should be reversed. What was needed was strong third-party intervention that would ensure arrival at a final status agreement not only on the Palestinian issue but also with the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon, within a well-defined implementation time frame. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 49.\t<\/span>Clare Short<\/strong>, Member of the British Parliament, pointed out that, when the whole complex issue of the barrier and the settlements was considered, it was clear that Israel had no intention of allowing the creation of a viable, independent Palestinian State in accordance with international law. That had been the policy of successive Israeli Governments, whatever the leader or party in power. She recalled Israel’s 14 reservations to the Road Map, in particular the fifth reservation stating that “the provisional Palestinian state would have provisional borders and certain aspects of sovereignty. It would be fully demilitarized, without the authority to undertake defence alliances or military cooperation. Israel would control the entry and exit of all persons and cargo, as well as its airspace and electromagnetic space.” She emphasized that, although Israel had insisted on the Palestine Liberation Organization recognizing the right of Israel to exist before entering the Oslo process, and Israel and the international community had insisted that Hamas had to do so, too, successive Israeli Governments had not recognized the right of the Palestinians to a sovereign State.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 50.\t<\/span>She said that, from looking at the map, it became clear that Israel intended to confine the Palestinian population to a series of cantons or enclaves, which were to perform the same function as did the Bantustans under the South African apartheid system. Israel sought to control the whole of Palestine, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, and, because of demographic realities, confine the Palestinians to the minimum land possible. The route of the wall supported that conclusion. As a result, Palestinians were hemmed in and humiliated whenever they wished to travel. Their economy was shrinking and unemployment and poverty were on the rise. The reality on the ground destroyed the prospect of a realistic two-State solution. Years of suffering and bloodshed would be the consequence. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 51.\t<\/span>She emphasized that such behaviour was a complete breach of international law. Israel was incorporating territory taken by force, in breach of a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations. Its settlements, collective punishments, failure to provide decent conditions for civilians in the Occupied Territories and its treatment of prisoners were grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and no country or High Contracting Party did anything about it. The same was true with the ICJ ruling on the wall. Although the advisory opinion declared the route of the wall illegal and had spelled out the obligations of the international community, neither the United States nor the European Union nor Russia did anything to enforce that judgement. She strongly criticized the guarantees given by US President Bush in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon prejudging the outcome of a number of permanent status issues, such as the fate of the refugees and settlements. Those guarantees had been supported by overwhelming votes in both houses of the US Congress. She was certain that they would constrain any incoming new Administration. She also criticized the European Union for not upholding international law in its relations with Israel by not insisting on human rights conditionalities that were part of its treaty system.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 52.\t<\/span>She concluded that, in redress of that situation through this Committee, or through civil society or groups of countries, every effort should be made to reunify the Palestinians. Civil society worldwide should insist that international law be enforced, and Europeans must pressure the Union and national Governments to uphold the human rights provisions of their trade law. In addition, the United Nations should withdraw from the Quartet, because the role of the United Nations was to uphold international law, not collude in it being profoundly undermined. European Union countries, together with big nations from the South, should form a new “coalition of the willing” and work for Palestinian unity and the enforcement of international law.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 53.\t<\/span>Nasrat Dakwar<\/strong>, lawyer for the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, emphasized that the separation barrier rendered illegal settlements in the West Bank a fait accompli and severely violated the fundamental rights of Palestinians, separating children from schools, workers from their workplaces, farmers from their land and the sick from medical treatment. He pointed out that the daily lives of almost 850,000 Palestinians had been negatively affected, disrupted and changed beyond recognition owing to the barrier, underlined that ICJ had recognized that its planning and construction had been accomplished with blatant disregard for and in absolute violation of international humanitarian law. He said that the defence of the citizens of Israel needed to be carried out in accordance with international law. Not every measure was legitimate, and the flagrant disregard for the rights of the Palestinians could not be allowed. All measures taken had to conform with international law and not be legitimized under the pretext of military necessity, national security or maintaining order.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 54.\t<\/span>Mr. Dakwar described the Association for Civil Rights in Israel as a leading human rights organization in Israel and the only one that addressed the full spectrum of rights and liberties. It had played a central role in the legal struggle against the lawfulness of the construction of the barrier. He highlighted that the legal struggle waged by the Association and other organizations in dozens of petitions to the High Court of Justice challenging the route of the barrier had succeeded in some cases in changing its route. That had significantly eased the violation of rights of the Palestinians and had also resulted in the return of some of their lands that had been slated for expropriation. The Association had also submitted to the Court an in-depth analysis of the ICJ advisory opinion and had challenged the route of the barrier as contrary to the principles of international law, emphasizing the illegality of the route of the barrier and of the annexation of territory to the occupying Power in breach of international law and stressing the fact that the route was determined by political considerations and not security. The analysis argued that the route of the barrier had been determined by the desire to create territorial contiguity between the settlements and Israel and underscored the ramifications of the illegality of the settlements on the legality of the barrier. He said that the High Court of Justice, in its ruling on the petition, had affirmed the importance of ICJ’s advisory opinion as an “interpretation of international law… done by the highest judicial body in international law” and stated that it should “be given the full appropriate weight”. Nonetheless, the High Court had granted its de facto approval to the construction of the barrier for the purpose of protecting the settlements and including them on the Israeli side. It had become clear that the route of the barrier had also been determined by the desire to further settlement expansion. Whereas ICJ had stressed the illegality of the annexation of East Jerusalem, the Court had approved the barrier in the area, which had clearly been determined by Israel’s desire to preserve the municipal boundary and make Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem permanent.<\/p><\/div>\n
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