±¬ÁÏÍø

2026 CEIRPP-CSO Consultations

¡°Engagement with European Civil Society Organizations: Mobilizing the European Union for Peace in Palestine¡±

?Convened by the

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP)

Conference Room Paul Henri Spaak, Sofitel Europe, Brussels

6 May 2026

CHAIR SUMMARY

The 1^st 2026 CEIRPP-CSO Consultations, ¡°Engagement with European Civil Society Organizations: Mobilizing the European Union for Peace in Palestine¡±, was convened in Brussels on 6 May 2026 by the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP).

The event provided a platform for European CSOs to: (i) brief on ongoing outreach to their governments and parliaments to implement the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion (ICJ AO, 19 July 2024); (ii) consolidate proposals for Third State compliance and distinction measures consistent with international law; and (iii) renew practical solidarity for ending the occupation, advancing self-determination and return, and realizing the two-State solution in accordance with international law and based on the relevant ±¬ÁÏÍø resolutions.

The Consultations also served as a platform to call for the joint Member States-CSO intensification of efforts towards EU Member States to abide by their legal obligations and responsibilities under relevant ±¬ÁÏÍø resolutions and in accordance with ICJ Advisory Opinions and to actively engage to promote multilateral mobilisation for respect for international law and a just and peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, including civil society, parliamentarians, regional organizations and others, to end the illegal Israeli occupation, realize the Palestinian people¡¯s inalienable rights and achieve a just and lasting peace. They contributed to the call for the EU to step forward as a proactive guarantor of international law, leveraging its diplomatic, economic, financial and political tools to enforce compliance, uphold human rights, and support a credible, just, and sustainable path toward peace.

Opening Session

At the Opening Session, Minister Riyad Mansour, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations, thanked the Committee and European civil society partners for their support. He called on European civil society, parliaments, governments, and EU institutions to not become complacent despite a fragile ceasefire, stressing that killings, displacement, and suffering continue in Gaza and the West Bank. He highlighted the 2024 ICJ AO declaring the Israeli occupation illegal, as a vital tool for action, calling for sustained pressure to implement it.

Min. Mansour praised mass European mobilization for the Gaza ceasefire and Palestinian freedom, encouraging activists to push governments to stop arms sales to Israel, suspend trade agreements, impose consequences for violations of international law, and uphold humanitarian principles consistently. Drawing inspiration from anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa and Namibia, he stated that Palestinians remain resilient and determined not to leave their homeland. He concluded that collective pressure, legal action, and solidarity are essential until Palestine is free.

The Chair of the Committee and Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations in New York, Ambassador Coly Seck, highlighted that across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (OPT) the situation continues to deteriorate, marked by increasing fragmentation, dispossession, and humanitarian distress. In Gaza, widespread destruction, large-scale displacement, and the collapse of basic living conditions persist, with severe long-term developmental consequences, underscoring that the crisis cannot be separated from the broader political context. In the West Bank, ongoing settler violence, demolitions, and movement restrictions contribute to a coercive environment affecting Palestinian communities. In occupied East Jerusalem, measures continue to alter the city¡¯s demographic composition and cultural character, alongside restrictions on access to holy sites and freedom of worship.

Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, need to be treated as a single political, legal, and territorial unit, requiring the consistent application of international law and respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. Amb. Seck emphasized that Europe¡¯s role remains central, given its political, legal, humanitarian, and economic leverage, alongside the need to translate commitments into concrete action. In this context civil society organizations continue to be essential allies in sustaining international attention and supporting the drive for accountability. He further stated that international law cannot be applied selectively and that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination, cannot remain indefinitely deferred.

Panel 1 ¨C European civil society initiatives to advance third-State obligations and Israel¡¯s accountability

Ms. , Humanitarian Expert with Oxfam Brussels, speaking on ¡°The cost of impunity in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem¡±, argued that impunity is not merely the absence of punishment, but a structural condition that has allowed the situation in Palestine to deteriorate over time. Speaking from a humanitarian perspective, she said that its cost is measured in human lives and in the destruction of conditions necessary for survival. In Gaza, she cited approximately 71,000 Palestinians killed and 172,000 injured, noting that these figures exclude indirect deaths caused by the collapse of health care, exposure, hunger and lack of treatment. While the daily death toll has decreased since the ceasefire, she stressed that underlying conditions remain unchanged, with restrictions on food, water, fuel, medical supplies and reconstruction materials continuing to impede humanitarian response.

She referred to assessments indicating that Gaza¡¯s development has been set back by 77 years and that reconstruction needs are estimated at $71 billion over the next decade. Humanitarian access remains the central operational challenge, with truck entries far below agreed levels, critical items blocked under ¡®dual-use¡¯ restrictions, and Oxfam alone having approximately $2.5 million worth of humanitarian materials held in warehouses in Egypt and Jordan. Food access remains irregular and unaffordable for much of the population, with unemployment at 92 per cent, while water shortages, damaged infrastructure, lack of fuel and poor hygiene conditions have increased public health risks. Skin infections and pest infestations have more than tripled in some displacement sites since January 2026, and some 850,000 people still require emergency shelter assistance.

In the West Bank, Ms. Bertrans-Sanz described a population under increasing duress, citing around 1,000 checkpoints and other movement restrictions, approximately 800,000 settlers, and continuing displacement driven largely by settler violence. Around 35,000 Palestinians were displaced in the previous year and more than 1,800 as of April 2026, with 60 per cent of those affected living in the Jordan Valley. She also highlighted sexualized and gender-based settler violence as a key driver of displacement, with more than 70 per cent of displaced households citing threats against women and children as the decisive reason for fleeing. In occupied East Jerusalem, around 1,800 Palestinian residents in Silwan face the risk of expulsion.

She also outlined severe constraints facing humanitarian organizations, including restricted access to affected populations, settler attacks on humanitarian operations, administrative and legal pressures, disinformation, deregistration threats, and restrictions on international staff rotations. She emphasized the exhaustion of local humanitarian staff in Gaza and noted that approximately
600 humanitarian workers have been killed, making it the deadliest conflict for aid workers ever recorded. Accountability, she concluded, remains essential to ending the cycle of impunity and enabling humanitarian work in accordance with international law.

Mr. Claudio Francavilla, Associate Director of Human Rights Watch Brussels, speaking on ¡°EU political and legal obligations¡±, outlined the obligations of European Union member States under the Genocide Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU Common Position on arms exports, general international law, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the July 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. He stressed that the duty to prevent genocide arises once a State is aware, or should normally be aware, of a serious risk that genocide may be committed, and does not require a final legal determination that genocide is already underway. In that regard, he cited the three binding provisional measures orders issued by the ICJ since January 2024 in the case brought by South Africa, the declaration of famine in parts of Gaza in August 2025, and the finding by a United Nations Commission of Inquiry that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. He noted that EU institutions and member States were aware of these risks through diplomatic reporting and repeated briefings by humanitarian agencies, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Mr. Francavilla argued that, despite this awareness, the European Union and its member States had failed to use the legal and political tools available to them. These include halting arms transfers and transit to Israel where there is a serious risk that weapons may be used to commit international crimes; adopting targeted sanctions against Israeli officials responsible for war crimes and other grave abuses; suspending at least the trade pillar of the EU¨CIsrael Association Agreement; banning trade with illegal settlements; and cooperating fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC), including with respect to arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant. He noted that an EU-wide arms embargo and targeted sanctions would require unanimity, while suspension of the trade pillar of the Association Agreement would require a qualified majority of member States representing at least 65 per cent of the EU population.

He further recalled that the July 2024 ICJ AO found Israel¡¯s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful and identified obligations for all States not to assist in maintaining that situation, including through trade or investment relations linked to settlements. In this context, he referred to calls by civil society organizations, trade unions, several EU States and members of the European Parliament for a ban on EU trade with settlements, arguing that tariff measures would be insufficient because they would not prevent such trade. Spain had already adopted a unilateral ban on trade in goods and services with settlements, while other member States were considering similar measures.

Mr. Francavilla observed that political obstacles within the European Union, including unanimity and qualified-majority requirements, have limited action, particularly in light of opposition by certain member States. However, institutional constraints do not remove the underlying legal obligations of States and EU institutions. He concluded that Europe¡¯s continued inaction contributes to impunity, and that humanitarian assistance, while important, cannot compensate for the failure to act on the violations that make such assistance necessary. Mass public mobilization across Europe had helped shift the debate, but further pressure was needed to ensure that proposed measures are adopted rather than remaining on the table.

Mr. , Political Economist based in Germany, speaking on ¡°The Mapping of Individual Best Practices¡± addressed the theme of ¡®individual best practices¡¯ by arguing that responsibility may be individual, but effective action must be collective, coordinated and strategic. Referring to remarks attributed to Avi Bluth, Chief of the Israeli Central Command, who reportedly had said Israeli forces were ¡®killing like we have not killed since 1967,¡¯ Mr. Hever argued that such statements reflected the extent of Israeli impunity and the failure of external actors to exert sufficient pressure. He cautioned against approaches that reduce accountability to narrow ¡®responsibility of conduct¡¯ standards, whereby Governments, courts or companies avoid action unless violations are linked to specific weapons, actors, incidents or victims. Drawing on his experience, he noted that courts have often declined to act on arms transfers despite overwhelming evidence unless a direct evidentiary chain can be established, creating a loophole that enables continued complicity.

Mr. Hever stressed that civil society exists in part to hold Governments accountable and that mobilization should focus on concrete outcomes capable of changing the situation on the ground. Civil society¡¯s power lies in pressuring the Governments under whose jurisdiction it operates. In that regard, he highlighted the role of trade unions, universities, financial institutions, churches, pension funds, banks and other organized actors in building collective pressure for divestment, ending cooperation with institutions linked to the occupation and genocide allegations, and obstructing arms shipments and other forms of complicity. Mr. Hever cited the example of ports and arms shipments, noting that Governments may avoid seeking information about cargo because knowledge would trigger a duty to act, while trade unions can demand manifests and refuse to process weapons or dual-use items destined for Israel.

He also underlined the importance of collective action within academic and financial institutions, calling for institutional severance of ties with Israeli academia and institutional divestment from companies enabling Israeli violations, rather than isolated individual refusals to cooperate or invest. Such coordinated pressure, he argued, is necessary to move from civil society mobilization to Government-imposed sanctions.

Mr. Hever further raised concerns regarding the use of artificial intelligence and decision-support systems in military operations. Such technologies are mechanisms that may diffuse or obscure responsibility by allowing soldiers to claim reliance on AI-generated information while decisions lead to large-scale harm and these practices risk reshaping the relationship between human decision-making and responsibility in warfare and may spread beyond Israel unless challenged by organized civil society action.

Ms. , RESCOP Spokesperson from Spain, also speaking on ¡°The Mapping of Individual Best Practices¡±, presented the experience of Spanish civil society mobilization and conveyed what she described as a clear message from Spanish civil society: the urgent need to sanction Israel. Spain¡¯s comparatively stronger positions had been driven by sustained public pressure, anti-war and anti-colonial organizing, political education and the work of networks such as RESCOP, with the Palestinian diaspora playing a central role in shaping and sustaining mobilization. She welcomed steps taken by the Spanish Government, including its refusal to allow Spanish territory to be used for United States attacks on Iran and the adoption, in October 2025, of a royal decree law limiting military relations with Israel. However, the measure did not amount to a full embargo, citing research indicating that military relations had barely decreased, and Spain should end all military, economic and diplomatic ties that contribute to violations of international law.

She called for the suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, an arms embargo covering imports, exports and transit, trade restrictions, sanctions and measures to end complicity across cultural, academic, sporting and economic fields. Spain¡¯s call for suspension of the Association Agreement must be matched by coherence at the national level, including the termination of Spain¡¯s own ties with Israel. Other States should join Spain, Slovenia and Ireland in pressing for suspension of the Agreement, while urging the European Union to ban trade, enforce an arms embargo and activate sanctions, like the measures taken against apartheid South Africa.

Ms. Samson Estape described legal and advocacy initiatives in Spain concerning companies alleged to be involved in the occupation or in military supply chains, including the filing of a case before the National Court against Sidenor, a company accused of selling steel to an Israeli military company. She also referred to broader campaigns exposing complicit agreements and opposing normalization in academic, cultural and sporting spaces. Such actions were the result of years of organized pressure, including outreach to public broadcasters, artists, journalists and institutions, and had contributed to shifts in public consciousness.

She further emphasized the importance of coalition-building among Palestinian diaspora actors, anti-racist, anti-colonial, feminist, climate justice, queer and trade union movements, arguing that the struggle for Palestine is connected to broader struggles against racism, colonialism and injustice. Ms. Samson Estape warned against repression of Palestine solidarity activism, noting that many protesters faced sanctions, but stressed that rights are won through their exercise, and concluded that civil society would continue organizing and building pressure until all forms of complicity end and Governments act.

During the discussion, participants addressed the legality of Israel¡¯s military presence in the occupied West Bank, accountability for violations, corporate responsibility, humanitarian access to Gaza, and ways to strengthen advocacy at EU and member-State levels. They emphasized that the Israeli army is an occupying military force bound by the Geneva Conventions and the laws of occupation and war, while the July 2024 ICJ Advisory Opinion declared Israel¡¯s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful. Gaza and East Jerusalem were reaffirmed as part of the OPT, and the illegality of the occupation and settlements was presented as requiring action regardless of the conduct of individual soldiers or settlers.

Settler violence and impunity were discussed as state-backed, including through official incitement, arms distribution, military presence during attacks and failures of accountability. Participants noted reports of sexual and gender-based violence as a driver of displacement, as well as sharp disparities between low conviction rates for settler violence and high conviction rates for Palestinians tried in military courts.

Questions were raised about artificial intelligence and decision-support systems in Israeli military operations. It was noted that no Israeli soldier had reportedly been brought before an Israeli court for war crimes committed in Gaza or the West Bank over the previous two and a half years, meaning AI-based arguments had not been tested as a legal defence. Concerns were nevertheless raised that public narratives around AI systems could shift responsibility from soldiers and commanders to technology.

Corporate accountability featured prominently, with discussion of legal actions in Spain involving companies linked to the Jerusalem Light Rail, steel supplied to an Israeli military company, accommodation listings in illegal settlements, and arms transit through Spanish ports. Participants emphasized civil society investigations, legal complaints and trade union pressure as tools for exposing corporate involvement and pursuing accountability. Potential litigation against technology companies was also identified as an area for further exploration. Belgian litigation was cited, including action involving an Israeli shipping company and a case against the Belgian State under article 1 of the Genocide Convention, in which the Brussels Court of Appeal reportedly found Belgium¡¯s arms transit and export measures too late and insufficient.

Advocacy strategies focused on sharpening litigation, political accountability and public campaigning, including possible European Court of Justice cases concerning EU inaction on the EU-Israel Association Agreement or settlement trade. Participants stressed the importance of naming specific member States blocking EU action rather than referring generally to ¡®the EU.¡¯ Trade unions were highlighted as central actors, particularly in relation to arms shipments, ports, supply chains and worker mobilization.

Humanitarian access concerns included a proposed system for goods entering Gaza, reportedly treating almost all goods as ¡®dual-use¡¯.

The discussion concluded by linking Palestine advocacy to wider struggles against racism, colonialism, militarization, repression of migrants and attacks on social rights, stressing that stronger coordination, legal action and public mobilization are needed to turn proposed measures into implementation.

Panel 2 ¨C Recommendations: a roadmap for European Union action

, speaking on ¡°The EU-Israel Association Agreement¡±, argued that a suspension of the Agreement is a basic and long-overdue step in the European Union¡¯s roadmap for action. She recalled that the Agreement, in force since 2000, provides the legal and institutional framework for political and economic cooperation between the European Union and Israel and grants Israel privileged access to EU markets, while Article 2 conditions the Agreement on respect for human rights and democratic principles. Amnesty International had raised concerns about Israel¡¯s compliance for 25 years, including in 2001, 2006 and 2022, warning that Article 2 risked becoming an ¡®empty formula¡¯ unless violations were met with benchmarks, review and consequences. The European Union¡¯s own review in June 2025 had recognized breaches of Article 2.

She emphasized that the European Union is Israel¡¯s largest trading partner, with Israeli exports to the EU accounting for 28.8 per cent of Israel¡¯s total exports in 2024, and that suspending trade preferences would be one of the most powerful immediate forms of pressure available. In light of Israel¡¯s genocide in Gaza, unlawful occupation, apartheid and attacks beyond the Occupied Palestinian Territory, continued preferential treatment risks turning EU inaction into complicity. Suspension, thus, is both a legal and moral obligation under the EU¡¯s own treaties and international law, including the obligation to prevent and punish genocide.

Ms. Geddie explained that full suspension of the Agreement would require unanimity among all 27 member States, while partial suspension of the trade pillar could be adopted by qualified majority, making the positions of Germany and Italy particularly decisive. Eight States ¨C Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Lithuania ¨C were identified as consistently opposing measures, despite growing public and diplomatic pressure.

She referred to extensive mobilization in favour of suspension, including the Justice for Palestine European citizens¡¯ initiative, which had gathered over 1 million signatures in three months, as well as calls from 20 United Nations experts, more than 400 former EU ambassadors and diplomats, and 91 human rights and humanitarian organizations and trade unions.

Ms. Geddie noted that Amnesty International had launched a global campaign calling for suspension of the Agreement, including actions targeting Germany and Italy. While acknowledging recent shifts, including Italy¡¯s suspension of defence cooperation with Israel and wider outrage over Israel¡¯s death penalty legislation, condemnation and procedural delays remain insufficient. If collective EU action fails, individual member States should take unilateral or concerted measures and conduct themselves as if the Agreement were suspended, ending all cooperation with Israel that may contribute to grave violations of international law.

Ms. , Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur for relations with the Palestinian Authority, speaking on ¡°EU obligations to address illegal Israeli settlements in the OPT: From words to actions¡± stated that there has been no real ¡®status quo¡¯ in Israel and Palestine, only continuing deterioration that threatens the viability of a two-State solution. She criticized the ¡®double standards¡¯ in the European Union¡¯s application of international law, contrasting strong action in response to Russia¡¯s aggression against Ukraine with reluctance to act in relation to Israel¡¯s occupation, settlement expansion and violations against Palestinians. Respect for international law should not be treated as a left-right issue, but as a matter of right and wrong, and the European Union¡¯s credibility is undermined when implementation depends on the identity of the perpetrator or victim.

She also warned against conflating criticism of Israeli Government policies with antisemitism, while affirming that antisemitism in Europe is real and must be prevented and combated, alongside all other forms of racism and violations of international law. Settlement expansion, including the E1 plan, was identified as one of the greatest threats to the two-State solution, while the European Union was criticized for continuing to speak in support of that solution without taking sufficient action to preserve it.

Ms. Incir called for action on several fronts: suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement or at least its trade pillar; targeted sanctions against those responsible for illegal settlement expansion and other violations; compensation for EU- and member State-funded projects destroyed by Israeli authorities; a ban on settlement products; enforcement of the European Court of Justice¡¯s 2019 requirements on settlement-product labelling; implementation of decisions of the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court; and an arms embargo. She recalled that Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement requires respect for human rights, democratic principles and international law, but argued that the European Union has continued ¡®business as usual¡¯ despite Israel¡¯s non-compliance.

She further noted that many foreign policy decisions remain national competences requiring unanimity among member States, which can prevent the European Union from acting in line with its founding purpose. The European Union had been created in the post-Second World War context, alongside the United Nations, to ensure that mass atrocities would not be repeated against any group. In that regard, EU silence and inaction are a form of complicity and a source of shame. Ms. Incir concluded by emphasizing that electoral outcomes matter, both at European and national levels, because the political composition of the European Parliament and member State governments directly affects the scope for meaningful EU action on Israel and Palestine.

Mr. Hans Lammerant, Researcher at Antigone Global Justice Initiative, speaking on ¡°Arms trade in the context of Israeli breaches¡± described arms trade as a critical lever for addressing violations of international law, noting that few States can sustain major military operations without external arms supplies. The Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, human rights law, including the right to life, the Arms Trade Treaty and the European Union Common Position on arms exports established obligations to deny transfers where there is knowledge or a clear risk that weapons or military technology may be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law. Also, the EU Common Position requires assessment of the destination country¡¯s respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as whether exported equipment could be used to assert territorial claims by force.

He argued that the legal framework is often treated by Governments as a form of plausible deniability rather than as a mechanism for preventing harm. Despite clear obligations, European States continue to authorize arms exports to Israel, with 2024 licences reportedly including approximately €360 million ($419 million) from France and more than €160 million ($186 million) from Germany. Obligations are not limited to direct exports, but extend to indirect exports, components incorporated into weapons systems supplied by third countries, explosives and other materials used in munitions, as well as transit and overflight. European-made components are present in military aircraft used by Israel, while explosives produced in Europe are part of munitions used in Gaza.

Mr. Lammerant referred to Belgium as an example of both progress and loopholes. Belgium has had an arms embargo on paper since 2009, following exposure that F-16s used in Gaza had been renovated in Belgium, yet export licences continued through exceptions, including for explosives. Legal pressure reportedly had contributed to the suspension of such a licence. Litigation and judicial decisions in Belgium and the Netherlands were examples of checks and balances that can compel Governments to apply existing legal standards, including cases concerning arms transit, overflight and F-35 components.

He recommended stronger enforcement of arms-export controls, suspension of current licences, denial of new licences, action on transit and overflight, scrutiny of indirect exports and imports from Israel¡¯s military industry, and human rights due diligence in public procurement. Mr. Lammerant also emphasized the importance of strategic litigation before national courts and, where possible, the Court of Justice of the European Union, noting that aspects of Arms Trade Treaty implementation may fall within EU competence under the common commercial policy.

Ms. Lisa Musiol, Head of EU Affairs at the International Crisis Group Brussels Office, speaking on ¡°The EU, the New York Declaration, the Global Alliance, and the Gaza Peace Plan¡± examined the relationship between the New York Declaration, the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution and the Gaza peace plan associated with the United States, including the Board of Peace framework and Security Council resolution 2803 (2025). These tracks should not be assumed to be automatically complementary: the New York Declaration and the Global Alliance place Palestinian statehood, self-determination and the two-State solution at the centre, whereas the Gaza plan risks imposing arrangements akin to a United States-led protectorate with limited Palestinian ownership.

She stressed the importance of maintaining international diplomatic support for a two-State solution and of ensuring that Gaza and the West Bank are not treated as separate files. The Global Alliance remains important not only to preserve a multilateral political horizon, but also to keep attention on the West Bank, where settlement expansion, settler and military violence, displacement, the weakening of the Palestinian Authority and pressure on public services risk pushing Palestinian institutions toward systemic collapse. Separating Gaza from the West Bank would further undermine Palestinian statehood and self-determination.

Ms. Musiol argued that European financial support for Palestinian institutions and public services remains important, including through donor coordination, but must be accompanied by serious pressure on Israel to stop policies that weaken Palestinian governance and foreclose Palestinian self-determination. EU pressure had previously shown potential impact by raising concerns in Israel over the social and economic costs of Government policies in Gaza and the West Bank, and such pressure should be resumed and strengthened.

With regard to Gaza, she criticized a ¡®wait and see¡¯ approach toward the United States-backed 20-point plan, arguing that after several months it had not fulfilled its promises. There were continued severe humanitarian shortages, restrictions on items needed for repairs and reconstruction, the absence of an operating national committee for the administration of Gaza, continued killings since the announcement of the truce, lack of agreement on disarmament, the entrenchment rather than withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the risk of renewed military operations. Thus, temporary partition in Gaza could become a long-term reality.

Ms. Musiol emphasized that aid and basic needs should not be made conditional on disarmament, and that any demilitarization or decommissioning process must be realistic, carefully sequenced and tied to Palestinian ownership and rights. While coordination between the two diplomatic tracks may be useful, European actors should remain clear-eyed about their tensions and that sustained pressure on Israel remains essential to both.

During the Discussion, participants discussed the weaponization of antisemitism and the conflation of criticism of Israeli Government policies with antisemitism or anti-Zionism. The discussion affirmed that antisemitism in Europe must be combated, while warning that accusations of antisemitism should not be used to shield Israeli policies from criticism or weaken the enforcement of international law. Participants also emphasized the need for consistency in addressing racism, Islamophobia and other forms of discrimination in Europe.

Questions were raised about whether the two-State solution remains viable or has become an unattainable framework. The discussion stressed that the choice of political solution should ultimately rest with the Palestinian people, while external actors should focus on enforcing international law, ending the occupation, dismantling illegal settlements, preventing annexation and upholding Palestinian self-determination. Participants cautioned against allowing abstract final-status debates to distract from areas of broad consensus, particularly the illegality of the occupation and settlements as affirmed by the International Court of Justice.

The Gaza peace plan associated with the United States was also discussed, particularly the lack of Palestinian ownership in its design. Participants questioned whether meaningful Palestinian participation could be introduced after the fact. This was acknowledged as a central weakness, as the process was not built around Palestinian self-determination, though limited openings may exist through technocratic arrangements, regional mediation and continued diplomatic engagement.

The discussion also addressed the imbalance between conditionality imposed on Palestinian institutions and the lack of comparable enforcement of conditions on Israel, including under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The recurring scrutiny of Palestinian textbooks was contrasted with limited attention to Israeli textbooks and representations of Palestinians. Participants also emphasized the importance of public services, including Palestinian institutions and ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA, as part of the enabling environment for rights, stability and any viable political process.

Strategic litigation was identified as a possible tool to strengthen accountability, including in relation to arms exports, transit and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. Although ±¬ÁÏÍø Member States often treat arms exports as national competence, participants noted that within the European Union legal questions may be referred from national courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union, particularly where EU common commercial policy competences are implicated.

The Discussion concluded by stressing the need to move from rhetoric to concrete pressure and accountability. Measures such as suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement, restricting arms transfers, banning settlement trade and enforcing international legal obligations were described as both political tools and legal requirements. Participants emphasized unity around actionable demands ¨C ending the occupation, dismantling settlements, preventing annexation, halting arms transfers and ensuring accountability ¨C while maintaining solidarity with Palestinian self-determination and inalienable rights.

Closing Session

In closing the consultations, Ambassador Seck thanked the speakers and participants for their active engagement. He noted that the discussions had highlighted the important role of European civil society organizations in informing policy, documenting developments on the ground, advancing accountability efforts and sustaining public engagement on the question of Palestine. The ideas and recommendations shared in Brussels would inform the Committee¡¯s continued engagement with civil society, Member States and European institutions.

Minister Mansour, in his concluding remarks, highlighted that the Committee had adapted its modalities of engagement with civil society in light of visa and access constraints, including by convening regional consultations and using virtual meetings with Palestinian civil society organizations that cannot travel. He welcomed the growth, creativity and maturity of solidarity movements and emphasized that what is needed now is action.

He reiterated that ending the illegal occupation, realizing self-determination, supporting refugees¡¯ right of return and enabling Palestinians to live freely in their homeland are essential to a just peace based on freedom and equality.

Min. Mansour highlighted international law and United Nations mechanisms, citing the ICJ Advisory Opinion as an example of sophisticated Palestinian diplomatic action informed by Namibia, South Africa and other anti-colonial struggles. Palestinian self-determination encompassed statehood in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, refugees¡¯ right of return, and equality for Palestinians who are citizens of Israel.

He expressed confidence that the Palestinian people would succeed, urged European civil society to press Governments and the European Union to take concrete measures.

Key recommendations and areas for follow-up

The consultations generated a number of practical recommendations and possible areas for follow-up by the Committee, European civil society organizations, the European Union and its member States. These recommendations were framed as mutually reinforcing measures to uphold international law, protect civilians, advance accountability and support a just and lasting peace.

• Suspend the EU¨CIsrael Association Agreement, or at minimum its trade pillar, until Israel complies with the Agreement¡¯s human rights obligations and with international law.
• Adopt a comprehensive ban on trade with illegal Israeli settlements and ensure effective enforcement of settlement-product labelling and related trade measures.
• Impose a full arms embargo, including prohibitions on export, import, transit, overflight, components, dual-use items where applicable, and other forms of military cooperation that may contribute to violations of international law.
• Review, suspend and revoke existing arms-export licenses and strengthen national and European mechanisms to prevent indirect transfers through third countries or military supply chains.
• Adopt targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for serious violations of international law, including settlement expansion, settler violence, annexation measures and grave abuses in Gaza and the West Bank.
• Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and implement the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, including by taking steps not to aid or assist the maintenance of the unlawful situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
• Ensure full, safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza; protect humanitarian personnel; and support ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA and Palestinian public-service institutions without politicized conditionalities.
• Support Palestinian ownership in all diplomatic and reconstruction processes, ensuring that Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are treated as one territorial, political and legal unit.
• Strengthen strategic litigation at national and European levels against State inaction, corporate complicity, arms transfers, settlement trade and other conduct that may contribute to violations of international law.
• Engage trade unions, professional associations, universities, cultural institutions, churches, pension funds and other organized actors in coordinated campaigns to end complicity and promote divestment from companies and institutions linked to the occupation and serious violations.
• Improve coordination among European civil society organizations by identifying specific member States or institutions blocking action, focusing advocacy on decision-makers with leverage, and developing common messages around international law and accountability.
• Counter disinformation and reputational attacks against humanitarian and human rights actors, while defending the civic space needed for lawful advocacy, protest, boycott and solidarity action.
• Maintain sustained public education and mobilization so that solidarity with the Palestinian people is translated into concrete political, legal, economic and diplomatic consequences for violations of international law.

Related content:?

• Committee Engagement with European Civil Society Organisations in Brussels, Belgium – Question of Palestine
• EU¡¯s Political and Legal Obligations by Claudio Francavilla, Associate Director, Human Rights Watch (Brussels) – Question of Palestine