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The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err in deciding that Ms. Xing¡¯s candidacy was given a full and fair consideration, in finding that the administrative instruction on gender parity (ST/AI/1999/9) did not apply in this case, and in not granting Ms. Xing¡¯s request to amend her application. The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT has not been shown to have erred in requiring credible evidence of a clear and compelling nature of Ms. Xing¡¯s allegations of ulterior motives, which was absent.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that, although the appeal was technically inadequate because the Appellants had failed to specifically identify the errors allegedly committed by the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT, it had previously recognised that if an appellant was not legally represented some latitude may be allowed in the interests of justice. Accordingly, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that it would review the merits of the appeal. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT erred on a question of fact that resulted in a manifestly unreasonable decision by failing to consider the full application and the question of when the Appellants received notification of the...

Mr. Hammond¡¯s appeal is defective, as it does not address the issue of receivability or the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding that his application contesting his 2016-2017 performance appraisal was not receivable. Mr. Hammond¡¯s application was not receivable as the reclassification decision was taken by the General Assembly. It is not erroneous to call the reclassification of Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 post to an FS-6 post a ¡°conversion¡± or an ¡°abolishment¡± because, in effect, this classification resulted in Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 being abolished and replaced by, or converted into, an FS-6 post.

The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err in determining that the 11 November 2018 letter provided notification of the final administrative decision subject to appeal, since it contained the key characteristic of producing ¡°¡¯direct legal consequences¡¯ affecting a staff member¡¯s terms and conditions of appointment¡±.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal of the Judgment on the merits and a cross-appeal from the Commissioner-General on the receivability finding. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the cross-appeal was receivable, however ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed it in light of the Commissioner-General¡¯s request that his cross-appeal not be examined should the appeal be dismissed and secondly, because ±¬ÁÏÍøAT did not detect any error in the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT¡¯s order which found that the application was receivable. On the merits of the appeal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that Mr. AlMousa failed to establish any error in the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Judgment, although his appeal undoubtedly...

As a preliminary matter, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT declined Mr. Hossain¡¯s request for an in-person hearing and held that Mr. Hossain did not explain, at least sufficiently, why his appeal should be dealt with other than on papers filed. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law by rejecting Mr. Hossain¡¯s proceedings other than on their merits and for threshold jurisdictional reasons that it was empowered to examine and assist to establish. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT, while perhaps disposing of the case in an expeditious way, did not do so fairly, or certainly justly, as between the parties. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT admitted on appeal the...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the facts upon which ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA based its decision were established, in full respect of his due process rights. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT did not err as there was clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant committed sexual exploitation and abuse against a beneficiary of ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA; neither did it err in concluding that the disciplinary sanction was proportionate and lawful. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant, by having the complainant remove her pants and underwear and engaging in a such a sensitive and specific medical examination, which he did not have the required competencies and...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Secretary-General was correct to bide his time and to await the outcome on the merits before determining whether an appeal was necessary. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the appeal of the Secretary-General was not time-barred. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in concluding that Mr. Arango was a former staff member for the purposes of founding jurisdiction over the instant application: At the time of the contested decision not to select him Mr. Arango had been separated from service for more than two years, was no longer a staff member in the...

Contrary to the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s finding, Mr. Kollie¡¯s letter of 7 June 2007 to the ABCC cannot be regarded as a request under Article 17 of the Appendix D to convene a medical board and reconsider the Secretary-General¡¯s decision. Nor can the emails of 25/27 July 2017 and 24 August 2017 be regarded as a review of the 16 May 2017 decision of the Secretary-General or an administrative decision under Article 2(1)(a) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute. The emails of 25/27 July 2017 constituted an implied appealable decision by the ABCC to reject Mr. Kollie¡¯s claim for reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses. But...

The matter remanded to the Joint Appeals Board of ITLOS to be reconsidered and decided by a neutral first instance process

±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT did not err in concluding that the Agency had failed to observe its own regulatory framework and failed to act lawfully, reasonably and fairly in exercising its discretion. The discretion of the Commissioner-General to reject a request for these benefits such as EVS is not unfettered.

The Dispute Tribunal committed an error in procedure by relying on ex parte evidence in the form of three doctors¡¯ notes, of which the Secretary-General received the translated copies only two days before the issuance of the impugned Judgment, in violation of audi alteram partem. The Dispute Tribunal failed to consider the ¡°checks and balances to ensure transparency¡± instituted in established procedures as outlined in the Guidelines and the ability of the Applicant to raise timely concerns about potential bias after the interview. As there is no obligation to provide the names of the...

The ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT did not err when it found that Mustafa et al. had been informed of the impugned decision to deny a request to set their grade level at Grade 14 on 19 March 2018. Neither did it err when it found that the applications were not receivable, because the requests for decision review were submitted after the deadline.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the application for revision, because Mr. Sirhan did not present any decisive fact which could lead to a revision of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Judgment.

The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in fact in concluding that the ABCC had solely and exclusively rested upon the MSD¡¯s medical report, and the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT exceeded its competence in stating that the time limit under Article 12 of Appendix D would only start to run from the moment when the psychological symptoms were so severe that the patient acknowledged that his/her syndrome no longer allowed him/her to fulfill his/her professional obligations. In the light of the facts that the Applicant was able to return to his high level of functioning at work after he had been transferred out of HATIS on 1 December 2013, that...

The impugned ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Order clearly comes within its competence to issue appropriate case management orders. It did not exceed its competence or jurisdiction in issuing Order No. 123, and Mr. Zaqqout is not prevented from attacking the interlocutory order later if he appeals the final judgment of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT on the merits.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment, finding that the staff member¡¯s FTA was not terminated but rather, it expired in its own course. The Tribunal highlighted that a termination is initiated by the Secretary-General, under Staff Rule 9.6(a), and in the instant case, the staff member was not at all terminated on 30 May 2019. Instead, his FTA continued until its expiry on 30 June 2019, and until then, he retained his full position, rights and entitlements as a staff member of the Organization. The fact that the site was closed down, and the staff member was sent home with no work to do, is not...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT first dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that although the Administration has the discretion to reassign staff members, such reassignment must be reasonable in the particular circumstances and cause no economic harm to the staff member. It must also respect the procedural and substantive rules of law and must not be arbitrary. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed with the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT that the reassignment was performance-related and yet the staff member was never allowed the opportunity to address his performance issues prior to being reassigned. Regarding the appeal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT disagreed with the staff member that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT...

The staff member submits that the ¡°decisive fact¡± which was unknown to him and to the Appeals Tribunal was the erroneous interpretation and application from case to case of Article 10(5) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Statute, Regulation 11.3 of the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA International Staff Regulations and Article 9(1)(a) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT disagreed that a variance in the interpretation or application of the law from case to case constitute a ¡°decisive fact¡± that would warrant revision. The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that it did not meet the statutory requirements and that it was in fact a disguised...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT found the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT correctly reviewed and rescinded the contested decision because of the procedural irregularities encountered during the investigation. But in addition to the procedural issues, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT also noted there were other significant errors. The Tribunal found that the panel erred when it sought to determine the Medical Officer¡¯s intent during the breast examination. The panel had previously concluded that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the actions of the Medical Officer during the breast examination were sexual in nature. Referring to Section 1.3 of ST/SGB/2008/5, the...