±¬ÁÏÍø

In Judgment No. 2010-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-050, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the appeal was time-barred and not receivable since it was not filed within 45 calendar days of receipt of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT had correctly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to receive the Appellant¡¯s appeal before the JAB. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment. In Judgment No. 2010-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-050/Corr.1, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the Appellant was granted an extension of time to file an appeal to 16 February 2010 and he filed his appeal on that date. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that the appeal was...

In judgment No. 2010-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-050, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the appeal was time-barred and not receivable since it was not filed within 45 calendar days of receipt of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT had correctly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to receive the Appellant¡¯s appeal before the JAB. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. In judgment No. 2010-±¬ÁÏÍøAT-050/Corr. 1, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the Appellant was granted an extension of time to file an appeal to 16 February 2010 and he filed his appeal on that date. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that the appeal was...

It was not disputed that the Applicant borrowed money from a Sales Manager working in a company doing business with MONUC. In the light of the applicable law and in particular the financial and procurement rules, the Tribunal found that misconduct had been properly established. Nonetheless, the Tribunal found a certain number of mitigating factors such as the fact that he repaid the loan in full and that it was a ¡°one-off decision¡±. Therefore, the Tribunal took the view that the sanction was not proportionate.

The Tribunal found that both the decision to remove the applicant from her post and the decision to place her on SLWFP constituted a proper exercise of the Secretary-General¡¯s discretion pursuant to former staff regulation 1.2 (c) and former staff rule 105.2 (a), respectively. However, the Tribunal also considered that keeping the applicant on SLWFP for four years and four months breached staff rule 105.2 (a), as it did not serve the interests of the Organization. The Tribunal further found that this breach had caused the applicant moral injury for which she should be compensated. Disguised...

In ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment No. 037, Sethia (2010), the Tribunal set out the applicable law in determining whether the time limits imposed by the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal will be waived. In the present case, having considered the applicant¡¯s submissions, the Tribunal finds that they do not satisfy the requirement of ¡°exceptional¡± in Article 8.3 of the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal. The applicant did not abide by the time limits for filing his application with the JAB and subsequently, in his appeal against the JAB¡¯s findings, he also failed to abide by the time limits for filing his application...

The Tribunal found that it does not have jurisdiction ratione personae as Defence Counsel at the ICTR who have a particular status, which is defined by the internal rules of the ICTR and the Agreement between the United Nations and the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for Rwanda dated 24 September 1996.

The Tribunal found established the facts of which he was accused and considered they constituted misconduct, no irregularity was identified in the procedure and the sanctions were not deemed disproportionate. However, unlike the written censure and demotion, the prohibition of promotion for a certain period of time was not among the range of disciplinary measures foreseen in former staff rule 110.3 (a), which rendered its imposition unlawful, pursuant to the principle nulla poena sine lege. Hence, the said sanction was rescinded and CHF1000 granted as compensation for the loss of chances...

In ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment No. 037, Sethia (2010), the Tribunal set out the applicable law in determining whether the time limits imposed by the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal will be waived. In the present case, having considered the applicant¡¯s submissions, the Tribunal finds that they do not satisfy the requirement of ¡°exceptional¡± in Article 8.3 of the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal. The applicant¡¯s physical presence was not required in the U.S. for her to file her Application.

Judicial Review is a supervisory jurisdiction. It is not a jurisdiction which a tribunal may exercise over itself. The former ±¬ÁÏÍøAT and the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT were and are creatures of statute. Each has the ability, inherent to all courts and tribunals, to imply powers to prevent abuses of process; however, the jurisdiction of each tribunal is limited by the provisions of its respective empowering statute. In the absence of specific jurisdiction conferred on a statutory tribunal by statute, the power to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction such as judicial review cannot be implied. This conclusion is...

±¬ÁÏÍøDT found the application receivable and determined that the post number provided by the ICSC for reclassification purposes was that of a Compensation Officer with functions distinct from those performed by the applicant. Therefore, in the absence of a properly budgeted post, the request of the ICSC was a request for classification advice prior to a budgetary submission, which required General-Assembly approval. The reclassification proposal was not included in the budgetary submission to the General Assembly, and, accordingly, the General Assembly did not approve the proposed...

As the matter had been formally, although mistakenly, transferred to the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT in Nairobi and is registered in its records, it is appropriate to issue an order striking out the case so that this matter is formally closed on the court¡¯s docket and is properly recorded as such. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT ordered that the application be struck out.

The application was withdrawn by the Applicant.

The application was withdrawn by the Applicant in view of the informal resolution of the dispute.

Since the Applicant received an extension of time and failed to submit an application, ±¬ÁÏÍøDT dismissed the matter for want of prosecution.

The various letters of appointment that the applicant had received in the past contained a provision of non-expectancy of renewal. The applicant¡¯s main contention was that the non-renewal of his fixed-term appointment was an act of retaliation because he reported some allegations of financial fraud. The respondent¡¯s primary submission is that the non-renewal of the applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment was based on unsatisfactory performance as evidenced in some PAS reports, which had later been upheld by a rebuttal panel. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the decision not to renew his fixed-term appointment was...

The judge must raise on his/her own motion the issue of receivability of an application and in particular verify whether the requirements of former staff rule 111.2 (a) have been complied with since the request for review of an administrative decision is a mandatory prerequisite for filing an appeal before the ±¬ÁÏÍø Dispute Tribunal. The absence of the request for review leads to the irreceivability of the application (see judgments ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2010/158, Osman; ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2009/070, Planas; ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2009/054, Nwuke; ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2009/035, Caldarone). The Tribunal¡¯s competence is limited, pursuant to art. 2.1 (a) of the...

±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the applicant had standing in both cases and that the appeals were not time-barred. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the Organisation did not violate the applicant¡¯s rights when it decided that the provisions of ST/SGB/2005/21 were not directly applicable to him. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the applicant¡¯s complaint of retaliation was adequately and objectively examined by the investigation panel and by the Director Ethics Office, who agreed that no retaliation had taken place. Thus, the applicant received appropriate recourse. However, ±¬ÁÏÍøDT found that the applicant¡¯s rights were violated when the...

1998 reclassification: The issue of the 1998 reclassification exercise is long out of time and no circumstances justify the review of it now. 2005 reclassification: Examining the 2005 reclassification exercise is moot as the post was abolished and the applicant did not challenge the abolition. Withdrawal of SPA: In relation to the period for which the applicant¡¯s SPA was withdrawn, it would be reasonable to expect a notation of a change in functions in the e-PAS records as there was a crossover between two cycles. However, there was none and the SPA should thus be retroactively paid...

With respect to the decision to reject his request for leave, the application is irreceivable as no management evaluation was submitted. In general, the whole application is time-barred. No exceptional circumstances could be found. Even after the applicant's sick leave ended, more than three months elapsed before the applicant submitted his application.

Receivability: A decision which does not merely confirm a previous decision, but shows that in the meantime, efforts have been made by the Administration to find an alternative arrangement and sets a new deadline, may be considered as a new decision, which has the effect of setting a new time limit for requesting administrative review. In accordance with article 8.4 of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute, the three-year time limit cannot be extended, even in exceptional cases within the meaning of article 8.3 of the Statute. The Dispute Tribunal is not competent to hear the case under article 2.7 (transitional...