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The Tribunal dismissed the application as not receivable ratione materia.

The Applicant did not conduct herself with the ¡°honesty and truthfulness¡± that was expected of her. The Tribunal further found that the Applicant placed herself in a position in which her interests conflicted with those of the Organization.

The Tribunal held that the Applicant¡¯s challenge in relation to the decision to cancel his administrative leave (¡°AL¡±) was without merit. The Tribunal reasoned that the evidence showed that the Applicant was placed on AL after ±¬ÁÏÍøOPS had received allegations of intimidation, harassment and other misconduct against him in the Sudan office. The Applicant did not contest the decision to place him on AL but only the decision informing him that his AL had not been extended and that no disciplinary action was being taken against him regarding the allegations. Accordingly, the decision not to extend...

It was not unreasonable to infer that on 3 July 2015, having gone through the rigors of a criminal judicial proceeding and having been acquitted of all charges, the Applicants became aware that there may have been breaches of the applicable rules governing their arrest and detention as United Nations staff members and the waiver of their immunities. The Applicants¡¯ causes of action in relation to the remedies for the alleged breaches of the procedures under A/63/331 and ST/AI/299 arose on 3 July 2015. Accordingly, pursuant to staff rule 11.2(c) the Applicants were, therefore, required to seek...

The Tribunal dismissed the application on the merits.

The Tribunal accepted the application in part. It awarded the Applicant one-month¡¯s net base salary for moral damages and two-months¡¯ net base salary for breach of her employment contract. The Tribunal found that the manner in which the Applicant was treated by the ESCWA management deserved compensation. The evidence showed that the Applicant was removed from her functions without prior notice. She was requested to turn over her security pass and leave the premises immediately. She was not allowed to enter the premises without authorization. In this regard, the Tribunal found that compensation...

The Tribunal (a) granted the application in part, (b) rescinded the contested decision in part and replaced the excessive and unlawful disciplinary measure of dismissal with the lesser sanction of separation from service with termination indemnity; (c) ordered the judgment to be included in the Applicant¡¯s official status file and all references relating to the disciplinary sanction of dismissal to be removed from this file and to be replaced with the new sanction, namely separation from service with termination indemnity; and (d) in the event that the Respondent would decide not to rescind...

The Applicant was informed in February 2007 that his promotion must follow a competitive recruitment process. The contention that he should have been promoted to the G-5 level at the time could and should have been challenged when the Applicant received formal notification of his retroactive promotion in October/November 2007. He did not. He also did not challenge the Respondent¡¯s letter of 6 May 2015.

Whilst the prescribed form refers to ¡°judgments¡± and not ¡°orders¡±, the Tribunal found that this is a matter of form and not substance. The Tribunal found that the suspension of action Order No. 276 (NY/2016) was dispositive of the case at the time, and it also found that the motion under review submitted by way of a motion for correction of a judgment on Form ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/F.8E rev. 1 of July 2011 was receivable. The Tribunal considered whether, since the Applicant was requesting para. 13 of Order 276 be modified to include a subsequent occurrence, a revision was warranted under art. 29 of the Dispute...

Termination for misconduct vs. termination for facts anterior: Termination on the basis of staff regulation 9.3(a)(v) and staff rule 9.6(c)(v) is not to be confused with a measure involving separation as a result of disciplinary proceedings, including in cases where the facts in question could have constituted misconduct. Neither the procedure, nor the standard of proof is to be transposed from one to the other. Regarding in particular the standard of proof applicable to ¡°facts anterior¡±, in the absence of a clear applicable legal norm or ruling of the Appeals Tribunal, it may not be assumed...