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On the request for the oral hearing, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the matter could be considered just as well on written submissions and that it was not persuaded that an oral hearing was necessary in the interests of justice. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s complaints were about the content of the orders made, not about whether ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was empowered to make such orders, and as such, his appeal was not receivable and had to be dismissed. Noting that the case would be dismissed, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT made the following observations on the merits of the appeal: (1) ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was entitled to determine issues of receivability in...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Judgment. The Tribunal explained although there is no expectancy of renewal, renewal of FTAs are ¡°normally¡± for a period of two years ¡°at a time¡±. Because of the words ¡°at a time¡±, the Tribunal cautioned that although a new FTA would supersede a previous one, it would not necessarily subsume the previous one. As such, a subsequent FTA would constitute a separate FTA. However, the Tribunal also highlighted that the applicable law in this case allowed the Administration to renew FTAs for periods less than two years. In conclusion, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held there...

The ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err in determining that the 11 November 2018 letter provided notification of the final administrative decision subject to appeal, since it contained the key characteristic of producing ¡°¡¯direct legal consequences¡¯ affecting a staff member¡¯s terms and conditions of appointment¡±.

By including a paragraph about the possibility for a re-entrant to restore his or her prior contributory service under certain conditions in the A/2 form for designation of the recipient of a residual settlement, the Fund discharged its obligation to notify re-entrants such as Mr Duflos. There was no duty on the part of the Pension Fund to provide further information or clarification in that regard in the absence of any request from Mr. Duflos for information or clarification.

±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal, finding it not receivable. The Tribunal explained ±¬ÁÏÍøDT decisions on applications for suspension of action are not subject to appeal, pursuant to Article 2(2) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT Statute. The Tribunal also noted that this case did not fall under the narrow exceptions when appeals against interlocutory orders are allowed, i.e. when it is alleged that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT has exceeded its competence or jurisdiction. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT did not find any excess of jurisdiction in the instant case and therefore deemed the appeal irreceivable.

±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in deciding that Mr. Adriantseheno had been charged solely with sexual harassment, that his behavior towards Vo1 and Vo2 did not constitute sexual harassment, and that his due process rights were violated.

Given the modest level of compensation that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT awarded to Ms. Malhotra and its non-payment since 20 November 2020, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT awarded interest on the 3-month net base salary calculated at the US prime rate from 20 November 2020 to the date of payment.

The Secretary-General of IMO is essentially seeking comments on the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT judgment under the guise of an application for interpretation, something ±¬ÁÏÍøAT expressly proscribed in Kasmani. The ±¬ÁÏÍøAT¡¯s Fogarty Judgment clearly and unambiguously explicates the nature of the difficulty in a manner that requires no further interpretation. There is no ambiguity, uncertainty or irreconcilable conflict on the question remanded or the reasons for the remand or in the comments in paragraph 25 of the Fogarty Judgment that justifies an application for interpretation. While the applications for...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT agreed that the application was not receivable ratione materiae. The Tribunal explained that on 21 March 2019, it had become clear to the staff member that the Agency had not shortlisted her for these two posts. This information was confirmed on 21 March 2019 by HR to the staff member. The Tribunal also noted that there were nothing in the communications between the parties indicating that the matter would be reopened or reconsidered. Furthermore, the subsequent email from HR on 8 April 2019 detailing the reasons why she was not selected was not a new administrative decision but rather a...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT remanded the case to the SAB, directing that the appeal be reconsidered by a neutral first instance process that issues a final decision. Citing Dispert & Hoe, Spinardi, Sheffer, Fogarty, and Fogarty et al., the Tribunal explained that the SAB must satisfy the requirement under Article 2 (10) of the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT Statute, which requires that the first instance process produce a final decision on the appeal and not a recommendation to the Secretary-General, as was the case under the then IMO Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (SRSR). The Tribunal also called into question whether the IMO Secretary...