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The Applicant stated in his application that he had not requested management evaluation of the impugned decision. The Applicant cannot now make such request, as it was required to be made 60 days after he was notified of the contested administrative decision (see staff rule 11.2 (c)). That is, 60 days after 18 April 2017, which was the date of the impugned decision. The time to request management review thus expired on 17 June 2017, over a year before the application was made (19 June 2018); Given the Applicant did not seek management evaluation of the contested decision, the Tribunal had no...

While the Applicant was not required to request management evaluation before filing this application, she was, however, required to file her application with ±¬ÁÏÍøDT within; 90 calendar days of receiving the contested decision. The Applicant¡¯s 25 March 2018 motion for waiver failed to comply with the stringent requirement pronounced by the Appeal¡¯s Tribunal in Thiam because it was not filed prior to the filing of her substantive application but more than five months after the fact. Additionally, the Applicant¡¯s passing mention of receivability in her 17 October 2017 application cannot be...

As a staff member on an FTA, the Applicant had no right in law to have his contract renewed. The decision to abolish the post encumbered by the Applicant was taken for legitimate business needs in that it was within the discretion of the decision makers within OCHA to conclude that the functions being performed by the Applicant at the time were part of OCHA¡¯s core mandate and that there was not the need to have a dedicated unit to carry them out. Having arrived at this decision and having regard to the need to streamline services and effect the required cost savings it was legitimate for OCHA...

The complaint concerning the receivability of the decision not to grant the Applicant a continuing appointment was dismissed on two grounds. It was not receivable because the Applicant did not request management evaluation and secondly, because the Applicant was not in active service throughout the period of consideration as required by the provisions of section 2.6 of ST/AI/2012/3. The Tribunal found that the civilian staffing review conducted by the RSCE, resulting in the reduction of several posts, was conducted for a bona fide reason and its proposals were endorsed by the General Assembly...

The context of the impugned decision was important because it was central to the Applicant¡¯s case that the decision to exclude her from the comparative review exercise which led to her separation, was made in bad faith, and that it stemmed from the conflict surrounding the decision to transfer her from the CAS Office to the Supply Section. The Applicant¡¯s case was that she was unlawfully excluded from the comparative review pool for Warehouse Assistants. The Applicant was transferred to the Supply Section despite her repeated protests and the explanation given was that the move was made to...

The Certificate of No Contest/Lump Sum that formalized the Applicant¡¯s agreed separation has all the hallmarks of a binding agreement freely entered into by the Applicant for a consideration which he would not otherwise have been entitled to, and there is no suggestion by the Applicant that it was procured by duress, misrepresentation or other impermissible consideration or action.; Notwithstanding the fact that the Applicant did not clearly identify the decision(s) he sought to contest, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant¡¯s claims all relate to his period of employment with ±¬ÁÏÍøDP, which...

The Applicant, as an ad litem judge of the ICTY, is considered to be a ¡°non-Secretariat United Nations official¡±. It follows that the Applicant cannot be considered as a former United Nations staff member within the meaning of art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute. Whilst being fully cognizant of the Applicant¡¯s right to access to justice, the Tribunal is forced to apply its Statute, which prevents it from asserting jurisdiction over the application. As the Applicant does not fall under any of the categories of potential applicants described in art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute...

On receivability: Applying the test of Gabaldon, even though all the conditions of staff rule 4.8 had not been fulfilled, the Applicant had locus standi and was legitimately entitled to similar rights as those of staff members and that the Organization must be regarded as having extended to her the protection of its administration of justice system. She held a valid contract, the scope of which must be determined when other issues are considered. The reach and application of Gabaldon is indeed limited and does not entitle the Applicant to take full benefit of the Staff Regulations regarding...

The Applicant¡¯s education grant claim for his four-year-old son did not fall under the exception of section 2 of ST/AI/2011/4 Amend 1. To the extent that the entitlement for private tuition in the mother tongue of the; Applicant was part and parcel of the education grant and not separate from it, the Applicant would be entitled to it only where the child in respect of whom he makes the claim is entitled to an education grant. This Tribunal cannot decide as to whether the Applicant ought to have been allowed during the management evaluation process to review any documents and whether failure to...

The failure to re-interview the subject of an investigation to confront him/her with additional gathered evidence constitutes a breach of his/her due process rights: the contested disciplinary decision is unlawful since it was taken based on the evidence and recommendations of the SIU/±¬ÁÏÍøAMID investigation reports issued in January 2013 and December 2013, even though the SIU/±¬ÁÏÍøAMID continued the investigation and gathered additional evidence from two witnesses in January 2015 and April 2015. The new evidence was never brought to the attention of the Applicant or of the decision-maker before...