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Since the applicant, in a timely manner, addressed his requests to competent officials within the former system of internal justice and followed the advice received from them, it was beyond his control that he did not file his request for administrative review within the time limits; therefore, exceptional circumstances are given. In view of the provision of the letter of appointment quoted above, no termination was possible without keeping a thirty days notice period. The decision to terminate the appointment with immediate effect is in noncompliance with the applicant¡¯s terms of appointment...

Outcome: For distress: USD5,000. For loss of chance: (a) 10 percent of the difference between the salary the applicant actually carries and that she would have received in the D-2 position on a continuous basis, (b) 10 percent of any additional allowances and benefits she would have received at the D-2 level including adjustment of her pension contributions and consequent retirement benefits.

Articles 2(1) and 2(1) (a) of the Statute of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT define a contract of employment to include ¡°all pertinent regulations and rules and all relevant administrative issuances in force at the time of the alleged non-compliance. There is nothing before the Tribunal to evidence that the Applicant signed any LOA in relation to the offer made by the organization to employ him on the terms defined in the reassignment memorandum dated 10 June 2008. The reassignment memorandum contained terms that were not certain, that were qualified and cannot therefore besaid to have been a final and binding...

In its findings, the Tribunal found that the evidence in support of the charges was credible and that the Applicant failed to prove that the decision to summarily dismiss him was arbitrary or motivated by prejudice or other extraneous factors, or was flawed by procedural irregularities or error of law. With regards to the Applicant¡¯s allegations of breach of due process, the Tribunal could not find any evidence that the rights of the Applicant had been violated. The Tribunal was also satisfied that the Respondent discharged his burden of proof and that he made proper use of his discretion.

The applicant was ordered to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for want of prosecution by a prescribed time, and failed to do so. There being a failure of prosecution, the matter must be dismissed, as the applicant shows not interest in maintaining proceedings.Outcome: The application was dismissed in its entirety for want of prosecution.

The contested decision was linked to the decision to bar the applicant from entering the VIC in October 1999, when he was no longer a staff member of ±¬ÁÏÍøOV. Hence, the decision to deny his counsel access to the applicant¡¯s OSF did not affect and could not have affected his terms of appointment. The application was thus neither receivable before the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT nor before the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. Outcome: The application was rejected.

The contested decision did not affect the applicant¡¯s terms of appointment derived from his status as a former staff member or from his status as a retiree. Furthermore, there is not a contractual relationship between the applicant and the Organization derived from his voluntary service as a member of the Panel of Counsel. The application was thus neither receivable before the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT nor before the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT. Outcome: The application was rejected.

Outcome: The application was dismissed.

The apportionment of points was not done fairly or objectively in two respects:- Experience: logically, either both the Applicant and the selected candidate should have received the maximum 50 points or the Applicant should have been given more than the selected candidate.- Languages: the Applicant¡¯s had five less points than the selected candidate. An objective evaluation would have given her more. Outcome: The Tribunal found that evaluation of the Applicant¡¯s candidacy for the concerned position was not carried out in a full and fair manner and awarded her compensation in the amount of 4...

In declaring the Applicant¡¯s appeal time-barred on the issue of the reclassification of her post, the Secretary-General wrongfully considered that the Administration¡¯s failure to take action on the Applicant¡¯s appeal of a classification decision was an implicit decision of refusal that she should have contested within the time limits set forth in former staff rule 111.2 (a). ST/AI/1998/9 sets out special procedures for contesting a post classification or reclassification. In particular, it provides for the referral of the appeal to a Classification Appeals Committee. When an appeal is referred...