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The ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in dismissing both applications as not receivable. Regarding the first application, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT found that the Settlement Agreement encompassed all disciplinary sanctions imposed on 9 December 2022, including the deferment of eligibility for salary increment. Therefore, the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT was wrong to conclude that the deferment was outside the scope of the Agreement and that the Agreement had been fully implemented. The application for enforcement was properly receivable.

As to the second application, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Administration¡¯s interpretation of the Settlement...

The Applicant claims that, by informing her that she would only be entitled to the long service step increment in August 2028 instead of August 2026, the Administration effectively made a new and separate administrative decision that is reviewable under the Tribunal¡¯s jurisdiction.

The issue under challenge for the purpose of receivability was whether the communication sent to the Applicant on 19 September 2023 constituted a reviewable administrative decision.

The Tribunal found that there was no decision made by the Respondent in the 19 September 2023 correspondence that adversely affects the...

The Applicant claims that the Administration¡¯s indication that she will only be entitled to be considered for her long service step increment in August 2028, instead of August 2026, contravenes the terms of the settlement agreement signed previously. The issues the Tribunal considered for the purpose of receivability were, therefore, whether the subject matter of the application was one of the terms of the Agreement and whether the Agreement had been implemented or not.

In the Tribunal¡¯s view, the record did not allow to conclude that the deferment of eligibility for increment was a matter...

Receivability

The Applicant correctly submitted that he was not contesting the promulgation of the Mobility AI. It was clear from the content of the application that he did not challenge the existence of the Mobility AI as a regulatory decision of the Secretary-General affecting all staff members. Instead, he was contesting the impact of what he perceived as a specific decision made after he accepted the offer of appointment, i.e., that the Mobility AI would be a term of his employment contract. The Tribunal thus found the application receivable.

Merits

The Tribunal established that the Applicant...

The issue in this case is whether EG and SEG consist of two independent benefits that can be granted in combination.

Pursuant to sec. 6.1(a) of ST/AI/2018/2/Amend.1, the overall maximum amount of SEG shall be equal to the upper limit of the top bracket of the global sliding scale applicable to the education grant scheme. The law does not allow an interpretation where EG and SEG can be ¡°stacked¡±.

Indeed, the difference between EG and SEG is in the percentages of reimbursement that eligible staff members are entitled to receive. This difference in reimbursement percentage addresses the...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered appeals of judgment Nos. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2010/075 and ±¬ÁÏÍøDT/2010/076. On the issue of being barred from the ±¬ÁÏÍøOV premises, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT has jurisdiction over applications filed by a staff member, former staff member or a person making claims in the name of an incapacitated or deceased staff member. However, given that the Appellant was not a staff member at the time he was barred, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that he could not complain that the decision was not in compliance with his terms of appointment or contract of employment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that, as a holder of an SSA contract, the Appellant was no...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err when it decided that the present appeal by a former staff member to have access to the ±¬ÁÏÍøOV premises was not among the listed grounds of jurisdiction of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT and was therefore not receivable. ±¬ÁÏÍøDT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment.

To the extent that the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s Order acknowledged that the Appellant withdrew his application and granted the request for withdrawal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT upheld the Order. In every other regard, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT upheld the arguments made by the Appellant as to the manner in which ±¬ÁÏÍøDT granted the withdrawal request. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT erred in law and went beyond its jurisdiction in effectively embarking on a consideration of the merits of the case and in speculating about the Appellant¡¯s motivation in bringing his application. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT ordered that the recital of ¡°Facts¡± in paragraphs 4 to 7 and ¡°Considerations¡± in...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not err in fact or law in its determination that the applicable Information Circular did not entitle the Appellant to an EOSA, nor was it contrary to a higher legal norm. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the facts of the case showed that her resignation did not fulfil the conditions required by the quoted circular. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT specifically noted how the resignation was taken knowing the risks involved and caused the break in service, which determined the ineligibility for collecting the allowance claimed for, acknowledging that the Appellant was requesting an exception from the regulations to...

The Appellant appealed the amount of damages awarded by ±¬ÁÏÍøDT and claimed additional compensation for the excessive delay of more than four years, from the date she requested an administrative review to the date of the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant had been adequately compensated and noted that, unless she could show that she was singled out to work more than her similarly placed colleagues, it would be difficult to conclude that the Chief demanding a higher work output from the Appellant constituted harassment. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ±¬ÁÏÍøDT judgment.