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±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Organisation correctly excluded the Appellant from the recruitment process for not meeting the minimum education requirement, as he had not entered his educational credential accurately. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that the Appellant had had access to the Inspira Applicant¡¯s Manual and World Higher Education Database, which was embedded into Inspira. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant¡¯s argument that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT failed to implement the ±¬ÁÏÍøAT judgment to carry out additional fact-finding on the issue of whether Inspira reflected the variety of the educational systems of all Member States equally in 2016...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT noted that, at the time of applying for the position, information was available to the Appellant in the form of the Inspira Applicant¡¯s Manual, including the World Higher Education Database list, which meant that he had the information about how to reflect his degree correctly in his electronic application and that an inaccurate application would render him ineligible for the position. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT did not make any errors of law or fact in dismissing the Appellant¡¯s challenge of the decision not to consider or select him for the position. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the...

On the Applicant¡¯s claim that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT committed an error of procedure by not allowing him to submit an affidavit from his former supervisor, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT properly exercised its broad discretion under Article 18(1) of its Rules of Procedure in determining the admissibility as well as the evidentiary value and weight of the proffered affidavit. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that ±¬ÁÏÍøDT¡¯s conclusions were consistent with the evidence. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the Appellant did not meet the burden of proof for demonstrating an error in the judgment such as to warrant its reversal. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the...

±¬ÁÏÍøAT considered an appeal of the Judgment on the merits and a cross-appeal from the Commissioner-General on the receivability finding. ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that the cross-appeal was receivable, however ±¬ÁÏÍøAT dismissed it in light of the Commissioner-General¡¯s request that his cross-appeal not be examined should the appeal be dismissed and secondly, because ±¬ÁÏÍøAT did not detect any error in the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT¡¯s order which found that the application was receivable. On the merits of the appeal, ±¬ÁÏÍøAT held that Mr. AlMousa failed to establish any error in the ±¬ÁÏÍøRWA DT Judgment, although his appeal undoubtedly...

The Tribunal found that it does not have jurisdiction ratione personae as Defence Counsel at the ICTR who have a particular status, which is defined by the internal rules of the ICTR and the Agreement between the United Nations and the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for Rwanda dated 24 September 1996.

The post of Director of Human Rights in ±¬ÁÏÍøMISS was not a reclassification of the D-1 post held by the Applicant at ±¬ÁÏÍøMIS but a new post created to meet the need of ±¬ÁÏÍøMISS. It was classified as D-2 and the post held by the Applicant ceased to exist upon its abolition.; Given the importence of the Human Rights function in the new State, a D-2 post was justified. This was done in an objective manner having regard to the Secretary Council Resolution that governed the transition.; The evidence established that the consideration of the post of the Chief of Human Rights was done in conjunction with...

The Applicant claimed that the Administration had implicitly accepted that he was suitable as he had not been excluded from the process at the stage when suitability was discussed. Hence, and given that the applicable ±¬ÁÏÍøHCR recruitment rules provide for priority consideration of internal candidates, no external candidates should have been even considered. The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant did not meet the minimum educational requirements nor the required professional experience for the post; as such, he was not eligible and, thus, not suitable for the post. Despite him being an...

The Applicant, as an ad litem judge of the ICTY, is considered to be a ¡°non-Secretariat United Nations official¡±. It follows that the Applicant cannot be considered as a former United Nations staff member within the meaning of art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute. Whilst being fully cognizant of the Applicant¡¯s right to access to justice, the Tribunal is forced to apply its Statute, which prevents it from asserting jurisdiction over the application. As the Applicant does not fall under any of the categories of potential applicants described in art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute...

The Tribunal concludes that the Applicant¡¯s application for the three P-3 posts was not fully and fairly considered, since the Hiring Manager did not personally evaluate her candidacy based on the information included in the PHP and e-PAS reports, while formally endorsing the decision of the CSS/OSU not to shortlist the Applicant. The Applicant¡¯s e-PAS reports contained essential information regarding the Applicant¡¯s fulfilment of the highly desirable requirements for the job opening. The Tribunal concludes that it has no competence to order the Secretary-General to assess the way the...

The Tribunal finds it noteworthy that in relation to functional delegation of authority, the person in whom authority is vested by virtue of his/her position/function has the power to delegate that authority. However, such delegation does not equate to the delegator definitively ridding himself/herself of the powers and authority that he or she delegates. Legally, a delegator continues to maintain the powers and authority that he or she has delegated, and such delegation is thus revocable at any time. Therefore, both parties¡¯ arguments that the USG/OIOS could or should have ¡°surrendered¡± her...